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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation seeks to explain suspects’ decision-making processes within the 
context of a custodial interrogation by presenting a new model of confessions referred to as 
the interrogation decision-making model. The model proposes that suspects’ decision-
making process can be analyzed at two different levels—a micro-level process and a macro-
level process. Drawing on expected utility theory (Edwards, 1962; Shoemaker, 1982; Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), the micro-level process of the model introduces a 
mathematical framework to explain the psychological mechanisms underlying suspects’ 
single interrogation decision at a certain point in time. The macro-level process of the model 
describes the dynamic nature of suspects’ multiple interrogation decisions throughout an 
interrogation. These two processes jointly explain suspects’ decisions to deny or confess guilt 
during a custodial interrogation. 
This dissertation also describes two experimental studies that tested key predictions 
generated by the model. Experiment 1 (N = 205) tested the prediction that suspects decide 
whether to deny or confess guilt on the basis of a proximal outcome’s perceived desirability, 
or in terms of the model, its perceived utility. Experiment 2 (N = 158) tested the prediction 
that suspects decide whether to deny or confess guilt on the basis of a distal outcome’s 
perceived utility. The results of the experiments were mixed. Whereas the utility of a 
proximal outcome did not significantly influence participants’ admissions and denials of 
prior misconduct, the utility of a distal outcome did. These findings provide partial support 
for the model by showing that a critical factor affecting suspects’ decision-making is the 
perceived utility of distal outcomes.     
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CHAPTER 1. THE MYTH OF CONFESSIONS 
When Jeffrey Deskovic walked out of prison at the age of 32, he had spent nearly half 
of his life behind bars. “The time period to have a family, to spend time with my family, is 
lost. I lost all my friends. My family has become strangers to me…There was a woman who I 
wanted to marry at the time that I was convicted, and I lost that too,” he said, sadly (Santo, 
2006, para 4-5). The catastrophic transition that altered Jeffrey’s life occurred in 1990, when 
he was convicted of raping and murdering his high school classmate, Angela Correa. Jeffery 
had been targeted as a suspect because he was late for school on the day of Angela’s murder 
and because the police perceived him as “overly distraught” during Angela’s funeral (Santos, 
2006, para. 16). The police brought him into a small and isolated room. After being 
questioned for over six hours, Jeffery told the police what they wanted to hear—he confessed 
to the murder even though he was innocent. “I thought it was all going to be O.K. in the 
end”, he said, thinking that his innocence would be proven by the DNA evidence collected at 
the crime scene (Santo, 2006, para. 18). However, the jury chose to base its verdict on 
Jeffrey’s tearful confession, not on the contradictory DNA test result. Jeffery spent sixteen 
years in prison and was released only after the DNA sample obtained from the crime scene 
was determined to match that of another man—Steven Cunningham—who subsequently 
confessed to the murder (Innocence Project, 2016a). 
Jeffery’s case reveals the incriminating power of a confession. As the U.S. Supreme 
Court pointed out in the case of Bruton v. United States (1968), “…the defendant's own 
confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted 
against him” (p.7). McCormick (1972) expressed the same viewpoint when he said, “The 
introduction of a confession makes the other aspects of a trial in court superfluous” (p. 316). 
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Both archival and experimental research have confirmed the powerful role of 
confession evidence in the incrimination and conviction of both guilty and innocent suspects. 
For example, Drizin and Leo (2004) found that among a sample of proven false confessors, 
more than 80% were wrongfully convicted. Kassin and Sukel (1997) demonstrated that 
confession evidence strongly influenced the verdicts of mock jurors—even when they were 
told that the confession was coerced, even when they knew that the confession was ruled 
inadmissible, and even when they regarded themselves as not being influenced by the 
confession. In fact, a confession has such a profound effect on jurors that sometimes it can 
overwhelm the effect of exculpatory evidence, as it did at Jeffery Deskovic’s trial in which 
the jury gave more weight to his confession than to the contradictory DNA evidence 
(Appleby & Kassin, 2016). 
Because of its incriminating power, a confession typically leads to legal sanctions 
(Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). These sanctions can be so severe that common sense would 
suggest that even guilty suspects would form a solid mindset not to admit guilt during a 
custodial interrogation (Gudjonsson, 2003). Yet between 42% and 55% of all suspects 
confess when interrogated by police (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). These figures are not 
limited to guilty suspects. As revealed by the more than 300 exoneration cases reported on 
the Innocence Project’s webpage, approximately 25% of innocent suspects made self-
incriminating statements or outright confessions during a custodial interrogation (Innocence 
Project, 2016b). These striking numbers give rise to a fundamental psychological question: 
Why do suspects confess? 
 
 
3 
Empirical Research 
The irrational act of confessing has led researchers to examine factors associated with 
confessions, especially those associated with false confessions (for reviews, see Kassin, 
2008, 2012; Kassin et al., 2010; Houston, Meissner, & Evans, 2014). This body of work has 
established that situational, dispositional, and criminological factors significantly influence 
suspects’ tendency to confess when interrogated. The situational factors that have been tested 
pertain primarily to characteristics associated with a custodial interrogation, particularly 
interrogation techniques that police use to elicit confessions. The dispositional factors that 
have been tested include cognitive disabilities, psychological illness, and personality traits. 
The criminological factors that have been tested are suspects’ true innocence or guilt, 
criminal history, and the perceived seriousness of the crime. The following subsections 
briefly review the documented effects that these factors have on suspects’ confessions during 
custodial interrogations. 
Situational factors 
Interrogation techniques are designed to break down a suspect’s resistance to 
confession (Ofshe & Leo, 1997a). In the past, police relied heavily on “third degree” 
methods to extract confessions. Because it is conceivable that both innocent and guilty 
suspects alike would confess under relentless physical torture, needs deprivation, and mental 
suffering, third degree methods have been abandoned in the U.S. since the 1960s (Bedau & 
Radelet, 1987; Leo, 2004). Modern interrogation techniques, which are psychologically 
based, are broadly classified into two categories: minimization and maximization (Kassin & 
McNall, 1991). Minimization includes so-called “soft-sell” techniques, which lull suspects 
into a false sense of security, thereby encouraging a confession (Kassin & McNall, 1991, p. 
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235). They include rapport building, moral justifications and excuses (e.g., Russano, 
Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 2005), and reducing the apparent seriousness of the offense 
(e.g., Horgan, Russano, Meissner, & Evans, 2012). Maximization includes so-called “hard-
sell” techniques, which intimidate or threaten suspects (Kassin & McNall, 1991, p. 234). 
These techniques also encourage suspects to confess, but do so by causing them to believe 
that they are trapped by the weight of the evidence. These techniques include presenting false 
evidence such as false polygraph test results or false eyewitness evidence (e.g., Kassin & 
Kiechel, 1996; Nash & Wade, 2009), exaggerating the seriousness of the offense, and 
implying that suspects will receive harsh punishment if they do not admit guilt (e.g., Horgan 
et al., 2012). Though these psychologically based techniques are subtle and sophisticated, 
abundant research has demonstrated that they have powerful effects on behavior as evidenced 
by their tendency to elicit confessions from both guilty and innocent suspects (Kassin et al., 
2010).  
Dispositional factors 
Suspects’ susceptibility to interrogation techniques are influenced by individual 
differences. One of the most commonly studied individual differences is a suspect’s age. 
Both behavioral and neurological research findings have converged on the conclusion that 
youth are characterized by immaturity, impulsivity, a decreased capacity to consider future 
consequences, and an increased susceptibility to social influence (Grisso et al., 2003; Owen-
Kostelnik, Reppucci, & Meyer, 2006). Consistent with the idea that these dispositional 
attributes put juveniles at particularly high risk of falsely confessing, research has shown that 
juveniles are over-represented in false confession cases—35% of the false confessors were 
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below the age of 18 in Drizin and Leo’s (2004) sample, whereas only 13% of people arrested 
for violent crimes were juveniles (Puzzanchera, 2011).  
Many of the dispositional qualities that are associated with youth are also associated 
with cognitive disabilities. Research has shown that individuals with low IQ scores, impaired 
executive functioning, and reduced adaptive behavior are especially vulnerable to police 
influence. They are also impulsive in their judgments and decisions, qualities that increase 
their risk of falsely confessing (Kassin et al., 2010). For example, individuals with these 
cognitive disabilities are highly susceptible to leading questions and negative feedback 
(Everington & Fulero, 1999), and have difficulty understanding legal consequences of a 
confession (Cloud, Shepherd, Barkoff, & Shur, 2002). Because of these deficits, suspects 
with cognitive disabilities might confess to a crime merely to avoid the discomfort of police 
interrogation (Appelbaum & Appelbaum, 1994). 
Criminological factors 
Suspects’ true innocence or guilt influences their tendency to confess during an 
interrogation. Though innocent suspects are significantly less likely to confess than guilty 
suspects (Gudjonsson, 2003), they are uniquely vulnerable to a psychological mindset 
referred to as the phenomenology of innocence (Kassin, 2005; Guyll et al., 2013). According 
to this concept, innocent suspects strongly believe in the protective power of their innocence 
and fail to recognize the inherent danger of the situation. As a result, innocent suspects make 
behavioral choices that put their long-term interests at risk. For example, innocent suspects 
are more likely than guilty suspects to waive their Miranda rights (Kassin & Norwick, 2004), 
to agree to a show-up rather than a lineup that would offer them more protection (Holland, 
Kassin, & Wells, 2005), and to increase their willingness to confess when interrogators bluff 
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about evidence (Perillo & Kassin, 2011). As Kassin (2005) concludes, “… innocence puts 
innocents at risk” (p. 215). 
Criminal history is another factor that influences suspects’ confession decisions. All 
else being equal, suspects without previous criminal records are less likely to invoke their 
Miranda rights and are more likely to confess during an interrogation than are suspects with 
previous criminal records (Leo, 1996; Moston, Stephenson, & Williamson, 1992). Suspects’ 
tendency to confess during a custodial interrogation is also influenced by the type and 
seriousness of crimes of which they have been accused. Research has revealed that suspects 
more readily confess to non-serious offenses than serious ones (Madon, Yang, Smalarz, 
Guyll, & Scherr, 2013; Moston et al., 1992). Taken together, these findings suggest that 
suspects who are truly guilty, who do not have a prior criminal record, and who have been 
accused of a less serious offense are more likely to confess.  
Theoretical Models 
A variety of theoretical models have attempted to explain the psychological processes 
underlying suspects’ confessions. These models reflect three different theoretical 
perspectives, including psychoanalytic, cognitive-behavioral, and decision-making.  
Psychoanalytic perspective 
Models reflecting a psychoanalytic perspective emphasize the role of the unconscious 
as the key determinant of confessions. Both Reik (1959) and Rogge (1975), for example, 
have proposed that feelings of guilt and remorse drive suspects to confess. According to their 
models, suspects develop an unconscious compulsion to confess in order to release negative 
emotions, occasionally even to a crime they did not actually commit. Therefore, these models 
highlight the role of internal conflict and feelings of guilt in suspects’ confessions.  
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Cognitive-behavioral perspective 
The cognitive-behavioral approach to understanding confessions emphasizes factors 
that encourage suspects to confess by virtue of altering their cognitions and behaviors. 
Gudjonsson (2003), for example, has proposed a five-factor model of confessions. This 
model includes both antecedents and consequences of confessions that are categorized as 
social, emotional, cognitive, situational, and physiological. Antecedents are events that 
precede a confession, such as distress, physical isolation, and drug withdrawal. 
Consequences are events that follow a confession, such as police approval, feeling relief, and 
a reduction in arousal.  
According to the model, antecedents trigger confessions. For example, the heightened 
physiological reactivity experienced by suspects during an interrogation may weaken their 
ability to sustain denials of involvement in the crime, thus causing them to confess. 
Consequences reflect the short-term and long-term effects that the confession brings about. 
Short-term consequences reinforce suspects for having confessed. For example, after 
confessing, a suspect’s physiological reactivity may return to normal, thus reinforcing the 
decision to confess. Long-term consequences punish suspects for confessing. For example, 
once a suspect has confessed, s/he is more likely to be found guilty and face incarceration 
than if no confession had been made. According to the five-factor model, therefore, 
antecedents and consequences jointly influence suspects’ tendency to confess. 
Decision-making perspective  
Two models explain confessions from the perspective of decision-making. Hilgendorf 
& Irving (1981) first conceptualized suspects as decision-makers, proposing that suspects are 
faced with a series of decisions during custodial interrogation: whether to speak or remain 
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silence, whether to admit to the accusation or not, whether to divulge or conceal the truth, 
and how to respond to interrogators, etc. Hilgendorf and Irving noted that suspects’ decisions 
are governed by subjective rather than objective assessments of the perceived consequences 
and their probability of occurrence. They further argued that under intense pressure, suspects 
are motivated to obtain social approval from their interrogators and, at the same time, that 
their capacity to make efficient decisions is severely impaired. In short, this model highlights 
important factors that influence suspects’ decision-making during custodial interrogation.  
Ofshe and Leo (1997a, 1997b) have proposed a two-step decision-making model to 
describe how police manipulate and alter suspects’ initial denials to a confession during an 
interrogation. Police interrogators first attempt to move suspects from a position of 
confidence, where suspects believe that they will benefit from continued denials, to one of 
despair, where suspects believe that they will certainly be arrested, prosecuted, and 
ultimately convicted. Thus, according to this model, the first goal of interrogation is to 
change suspects’ perception of the immediate situation and to elicit hopelessness and despair. 
Police achieve this goal with interrogation techniques that lead suspects to believe that the 
case against them is so strong that they are trapped by the weight of the evidence. For 
example, Ofshe and Leo described how police accuse suspects of committing the crime, 
present suspects with incriminating evidence, and attack suspects’ memory. Once suspects’ 
confidence has been shaken and hopelessness and despair have set in, Ofshe and Leo propose 
that police interrogators transition into step two where they offer suspects incentives that pull 
for a confession by leading them to believe that it is in their best interests to confess. These 
incentives range from low end incentives such as the suggestion that a confession will 
alleviate feelings of guilt to high end incentives that promise leniency or avoidance of the 
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death penalty. Thus, the hypothesized two-step process is designed to influence suspects’ 
subjective assessments about their available choices and the likely consequences that will 
result. 
Is a New Model Needed? 
Empirical research has revealed a great many factors that influence suspects’ 
confessions. However, from my point of view, these research findings are scrambled jigsaw 
pieces that are waiting to be assembled into a complete picture. To do so, the field needs a 
theoretical model that can systematically explain the psychological mechanisms underlying 
suspects’ confessions. Such a model must be able to explain patterns of research findings 
related to confessions and to arrange them into a coherent and integrated picture.  
For two reasons, existing models of confessions do not achieve this. First, most 
models are descriptive rather than analytical. They describe the interrogation process, but do 
not explain the causal mechanisms that operate to influence suspects’ confessions. Second, 
even for models that have proposed underlying mechanisms, they reflect a piecemeal 
approach. The aforementioned decision-making models, for example, have proposed that 
suspects’ subjective perceptions of the probability of potential consequences play a 
fundamental role in confessions, but they do not explain how. How do suspects make 
confession decisions on the basis of their perceptions? In what way do police interrogation 
practices manipulate suspects’ perceptions of these consequences? How does this mechanism 
explain differences in the confession rates between the innocent and the guilty, juveniles and 
adults, and those with and without cognitive, emotional, and psychological vulnerabilities? 
Without a coherent architecture, these models are limited precisely because they do not delve 
deeply enough into the psychological processes underlying confession decisions.  
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In this sense, the question “why do suspects confess?” has not yet been adequately 
addressed. Thus, even though various factors and phenomena relevant to confessions have 
been examined, the field still lacks a theory that can assemble these individual jigsaw pieces 
together into a whole. 
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CHAPTER 2. AN INTERROGATION DECISION-MAKING MODEL  
This chapter introduces a new model of confessions referred to as the interrogation 
decision-making model. This model provides a systematic framework with which to 
understand, explain, and predict suspects’ confessions and denials within the context of a 
custodial police interrogation. The model conceptualizes suspects as decision-makers who 
must decide whether to deny or confess guilt when subjected to police pressure. The model’s 
conceptualization of suspects as decision-makers is consistent with existing models of 
confessions (Hilgendorf & Irving, 1981; Ofshe & Leo, 1997a, 1997b). It also aligns with the 
legal system’s standards of voluntariness which requires that, to be admissible in court, a 
confession must be given freely without the influence of coercion or threat (Grano, 1979). 
First and foremost, the interrogation decision-making model proposes that suspects’ 
decision-making within the context of a custodial interrogation can be understood and 
analyzed at two different levels: a micro-level process and a macro-level process. The micro-
level process takes an analytical view and considers a snapshot of an interrogation at a 
specific moment. It focuses on the psychological mechanisms that underlie a single decision 
that suspects make at a given time point during an interrogation. The macro-level process, in 
contrast, takes a holistic view and considers the panorama of an interrogation. It focuses on 
the dynamic nature of suspects’ multiple decisions throughout the entire course of an 
interrogation. The micro- and macro-level processes analyze suspects’ decision-making at 
different levels, yet they are naturally connected. The micro-level process forms the basic 
building blocks for the macro-level process, and the macro-level process identifies factors 
that influence the micro-level process. Together, these two processes help to organize and 
explain suspects’ decision-making during an interrogation. 
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Micro-Level Process: An Analytical View of an Interrogation Decision 
As mentioned above, the micro-level process of the model takes a snapshot of 
interrogation and anatomizes suspects’ interrogation decisions at the individual level. 
Concretely, the micro-level process corresponds to the psychological mechanisms that 
underlie a suspect’s interrogation decision at a specific point in time. This section presents a 
theoretical framework to explain and understand suspects’ micro-level decision-making 
process.  
The term decision space refers to the collection of all choices that suspects perceive 
as being available to them in the course of an interrogation. For example, during an 
interrogation, suspects may perceive themselves to have the choice to deny guilt, the choice 
to confess, and the choice to invoke their Miranda rights (Hilgendorf & Irving, 1981; Ofshe 
& Leo, 1997a). Although the model can accommodate all choices that exist within suspects’ 
decision space, for simplicity, the following presentation of the model considers only two 
choices: to deny guilt and to confess guilt. With this restriction in place, the decision space is 
mathematically expressed as, 
Ω = {Choices in an interrogation: denial, confession} 
Throughout this article, D denotes the choice of a denial, C denotes the choice of a 
confession, and x denotes either a denial or a confession. Mathematically, 𝒙 = 𝑫 or 𝑪. 
The micro-level process of the interrogation decision-making model explains how 
suspects decide between choices within their decision space to reach an optimal decision at a 
certain time point during an interrogation. Figure 1 presents a flowchart to illustrate the 
micro-level process that underlies suspects’ interrogation decisions.  
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Figure 1. This flowchart presents suspects’ micro-level decision-making process. The 
rounded rectangle at the top shows the starting step, during which different sources of factors 
are input into the process. The two sharp rectangles in the middle reveal the processing steps, 
NO 
1. Suspect factors 
2. Crime factors 
3. Interrogation factors 
1. Subjective judgments of a denial (choice D): 
 Outcomes associated with 𝑫 =  
𝑫𝒑
𝑫𝒅
  
i. Utility 𝑢(𝑫) 
ii. Probability 𝑝(𝑫) 
2. Subjective judgments of a confession (choice C): 
 Outcomes associated with 𝑪 =  
𝑪𝒑
𝑪𝒅
  
i. Utility 𝑢(𝑪) 
ii. Probability 𝑝(𝑪) 
3. Discount rate θ 
 
1. Expected utility of a denial (choice D): 
𝐸 𝑢(𝑫)  = 𝐸 𝑢 𝑫𝒑  + 𝜃𝐸 𝑢(𝑫𝒅)  
=  𝑝 𝐷𝑝𝑖 𝑢 𝐷𝑝𝑖 
𝑛𝑝
𝑖=1
+  𝜃  𝑝(𝐷𝑑𝑖)𝑢(𝐷𝑑𝑖)
𝑛𝑑
𝑖=1
 
2. Expected utility of a confession (choice C): 
𝐸 𝑢(𝑪)  = 𝐸 𝑢 𝑪𝒑  + 𝜃𝐸 𝑢(𝑪𝒅)  
=  𝑝 𝐶𝑝𝑖 𝑢 𝐶𝑝𝑖 
𝑛𝑝
𝑖=1
+  𝜃  𝑝(𝐶𝑑𝑖)𝑢(𝐶𝑑𝑖)
𝑛𝑑
𝑖=1
 
𝐸 𝑢(𝑫) > 𝐸 𝑢(𝑪)  ? 
YES 
Confession (C) 
Denial (D) 
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through which suspects form evaluation of the expected utilities of their choices. The 
diamond shows the decision rule according to which suspects make their decisions whether 
to deny or confess guilt. The rounded rectangles at the bottom indicate the end of the process, 
i.e., the final outputs generated by the decision rule. 
In Figure 1, the rounded rectangle at the top indicates the starting point—factors that 
influence suspects’ decision-making. The two sharp rectangles in the middle represent the 
processing steps. During the processing steps, those factors shape suspects’ subjective 
judgments of the proximal and distal outcomes following a denial and a confession; suspects 
then use these subjective judgments to evaluate their preference for a denial and a confession, 
which are quantified in the model as the expected utilities of these two choices. The diamond 
shows the decision step—once suspects form evaluations of the expected utilities of a denial 
and a confession, they implicitly compare these two choices according to the decision rule 
involved in this step. Depending upon the outcome of the decision rule, suspects’ micro-level 
decision-making process ends with one choice in the decision space—either a denial or a 
confession. This flowchart, therefore, presents the micro-level process that suspects use to 
make a decision between the two choices in their decision space.  The following sections 
elaborate on these steps.  
Decision step: How suspects choose between choices 
How do suspects make a decision between a denial and a confession? The model 
proposes that suspects make their decisions by comparing the expected utilities of a denial 
and a confession. They will choose to deny guilt if they believe that a denial will yield the 
greatest expected utility, but will choose to confess if they believe that a confession will yield 
the greatest expected utility. This decision rule is shown in the diamond, and its outputs are 
presented in the two rounded rectangles at the bottom in Figure 1. 
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Processing steps: How suspects evaluate choices 
According to the above decision rule, suspects make a decision on the basis of their 
evaluations of the expected utilities of a denial and a confession. Conceptually, expected 
utility reflects suspects’ preference for a particular choice. Mathematically, the expected 
utility of a given choice x (𝒙 = 𝑫 or 𝑪) is expressed below in Equation 1. 
Equation 1. 
𝐸 𝑢(𝒙)  = 𝐸 𝑢 𝒙𝒑  + 𝜃𝐸 𝑢(𝒙𝒅) =  𝑝 𝑥𝑝𝑖 𝑢 𝑥𝑝𝑖 
𝑛𝑝
𝑖=1
+  𝜃  𝑝(𝑥𝑑𝑖)𝑢(𝑥𝑑𝑖)
𝑛𝑑
𝑖=1
 
Four sets of parameters influence the expected utility of a choice. These parameters 
are presented by the symbols 𝒙, 𝑢(∙), 𝑝(∙), and 𝜃. The following subsections explain how 
these four parameters impinge upon suspects’ confession decisions. 
Perceived outcomes: Proximal and distal. The first set of parameters is presented 
by the vector 𝒙 in Equation 1. It represents all of the outcomes that suspects perceive will 
follow their choice 𝒙, whether it be a denial or a confession. The vector x is further 
partitioned into two sub-vectors 𝒙𝒑 and 𝒙𝒅. The sub-vector 𝒙𝒑 = (𝑥𝑝1, 𝑥𝑝2,, … , 𝑥𝑝𝑛𝑝)
𝑇 
includes all proximal outcomes that suspects perceive will immediately follow choice 𝒙 
during an interrogation, and the sub-vector 𝒙𝒅 = (𝑥𝑑1, 𝑥𝑑2,, … , 𝑥𝑑𝑛𝑑)
𝑇 includes all distal 
outcomes that suspects perceive will follow choice 𝒙 in the future; that is, after an 
interrogation has ended. 
To illustrate, consider the choice of denying guilt. Suspects who consider this choice 
are predicted to perceive themselves as likely to experience potential proximal outcomes, 
including longer detainment, additional confrontational questioning, and the continued 
experience of negative emotions such as hopelessness, anxiety, and stress (Gudjonsson, 
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2003; Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 1999). Suspects may also perceive the choice of denying 
guilt to have a variety of distal outcomes, such as exculpation, or perhaps a lighter sentence if 
convicted. The choice of confessing has a mirrored set of outcomes. Suspects who consider 
the choice to confess may perceive this course of action to not only be associated with the 
proximal outcomes of being released from an interrogation or being given permission to 
make a phone call, but also with potential distal outcomes, some of which could be quite 
serious, such as conviction, a lengthy prison sentence, or execution (Drizin & Leo, 2004; 
Gudjonsson, 2003). 
How do suspects make the optimal decision between the two choices of denial and 
confession when each one has multiple outcomes associated with it? According to expected 
utility theory, people evaluate the expected utility of a specific choice in terms of the 
probability and utility of its outcomes and, moreover, that they will make the choice that 
yields the highest expected utility (Edwards, 1962; Shoemaker, 1982; Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944). Applying the same idea to the interrogation situation, the interrogation 
decision-making model proposes that the probability and utility of the perceived outcomes 
are key elements that influence suspects’ interrogation decisions. When considering whether 
to deny or confess guilt, interrogated suspects will evaluate the expected utility of each 
choice in terms of its outcomes’ probabilities (i.e., perceived likelihoods of occurrence) and 
utilities (i.e., perceived (un)desirability of the outcomes). The idea that an outcome’s 
probability and utility influence suspects’ decision is reflected in Equation 1. 
Probability. In Equation 1, the function 𝑝(∙) is a probability function that represents 
suspects’ perception of an outcome’s chance of occurring as a result of a given choice 
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(Gilboa, Postlewaite, & Schmeidler, 2008). For example, a suspect may expect a 0% chance 
of conviction if s/he denies guilt, but an 80% chance of conviction if s/he confesses. 
Utility. Equation 1 also includes the utility function 𝑢(∙). It represents suspects’ 
perception of an outcome’s (un)desirability; that is, how much satisfaction, happiness, or 
“goodness” is expected if the outcome occurs (Mongin, 1988; Schoemaker, 1982). For 
example, a suspect may expect to experience a high degree of dissatisfaction and 
unhappiness if the outcome of conviction occurs. An outcome’s utility has two components: 
valence and magnitude. The valence of an outcome’s utility indicates whether the outcome is 
perceived as positive or negative. A positive valence represents a desired outcome, whereas a 
negative valence represents an undesired outcome. For example, if 𝑢(𝑦) is positively 
valenced and 𝑢(𝑧) is negatively valenced, then y is desired and z is undesired. The magnitude 
of an outcome’s utility reflects how strongly the outcome is desired or undesired. If 𝑢(𝑦) =
200 and 𝑢(𝑧) = 100, then both y and z are desired, but y is twice as desirable as z. Similarly, 
if 𝑢(𝑦) = 200 and 𝑢(𝑧) = −100, then y is desired and z is undesired, and furthermore, the 
magnitude of the desirability associated with y is twice the magnitude of the undesirability 
associated with z. 
Discount distal outcomes. It is well established that human beings temporally 
discount delayed outcomes (Berns, Laibson, & Loewenstein, 2007; Kalenscher & Pennartz, 
2008). Compared with larger rewards in the future, people prefer immediate outcomes with 
smaller values. This robust phenomenon of temporal discounting is also at play when 
suspects decide whether or not to confess to crimes. Empirical research has demonstrated that 
suspects have a propensity to focus on short-term contingencies, giving disproportionate 
weight to the proximal outcomes that are delivered by police during an interrogation, without 
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sufficient consideration of the distal (and often more severe) outcomes that may be levied by 
the judicial system if they are convicted (Madon, Guyll, Scherr, Greathouse, & Wells, 2012; 
Madon et al., 2013). 
Drawing on this body of work, the model predicts that suspects discount distal 
outcomes. Equation 1 represents this predicted tendency with the parameter θ. According to 
the model, the discount rate becomes smaller as suspects’ tendency to discount distal 
outcomes becomes greater. The interrogation decision-making model assumes that the 
discount rate, 𝜃, can only take values between 0 and 1, inclusively. The lower bound value of 
0 represents full discounting: Suspects make their interrogation decisions solely on the basis 
of anticipated proximal outcomes without any regard for distal outcomes. The upper bound 
value of 1, by contrast, represents the absence of discounting: Suspects make their 
interrogation decisions on the basis of both anticipated distal outcomes and proximal 
outcomes, without any discounting of distal outcomes. This assumption is expressed 
mathematically as: 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1. 
Table 1. Examples of suspects’ perceived proximal and distal outcomes 
 Proximal outcomes  Distal outcomes 
Valence (-) Valence (+)  Valence (-) Valence (+) 
Denial (D) 
Police disapproval; 
Extended detainment; 
More interrogation 
techniques; 
Anxiety, guilt and 
remorse from deception 
(if guilty).  
Convince police of 
innocence; 
End interrogation.  
 
 
 
Conviction based 
on other evidence. 
 
Not convicted. 
Confession (C) Discomfort from 
deception (if innocent). 
Police approval; 
Relief from 
deception (if guilty). 
End interrogation. 
 
 
 
Conviction and 
legal sanctions. 
Not convicted. 
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Table 1 lists examples of suspects’ perceived proximal and distal outcomes for a 
denial and a confession, respectively. In addition to the classification of proximal and distal 
outcomes, Table 1 also separates the perceived outcomes according to their valence. From 
the table, it may be noted that suspects can perceive a denial and a confession to produce 
different outcomes. For instance, suspects may expect that an interrogator will show 
disapproval in response to a denial but approval in response to a confession. It is also the case 
that suspects can perceive a denial and a confession to produce the same outcomes. For 
instance, it is possible that suspects, especially innocent ones, will anticipate that they can 
convince police interrogators of their innocence and end an interrogation by continually 
denying guilt; it is also possible that suspects, especially guilty ones, will perceive future 
conviction as a probable event even if they continually deny guilt if they believe that the 
police have other evidence to support incrimination. 
Subjective judgments. It is important to emphasize that suspects’ perceptions of 
possible outcomes are subjective rather than objective. Moreover, because the information 
that is available to suspects can be both insufficient and inaccurate, their subjective 
judgments may not be valid (Gilboa et al., 2008). In other words, it is suspects’ subjective 
beliefs about the probability and utility of likely outcomes, which may or may not be 
accurate, that influence their decisions. When people use inaccurate perceptions during 
decision making, their final decisions can lead to errors (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981). 
For example, if gamblers mistakenly estimate the odds of winning a lottery, then they may 
take the wrong action and lose large sums of money; if suspects underestimate the possibility 
of being convicted, then they may decide to waive their Miranda rights or confess during an 
interrogation (Kassin, 2005; Kassin & Norwick, 2004). 
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Starting step: Factors affecting suspects’ subjective judgments 
How do suspects form the subjective judgments of the parameters involved in the 
expected utility function? A great many of factors may influence the information that 
suspects use to construct their subjective judgments. For example, suspects’ knowledge about 
the legal system and the incriminating evidence presented by police may influence their 
perception of the probability of future conviction; suspects’ past experience in prison and the 
seriousness of the offense may influence their perception of the utility of future punishment; 
and suspects’ age, intelligence level, and mental status may influence their tendency to 
discount the future. Because these factors operate in the macro-level process, I discuss them 
with more detail in next section. 
Examples: Understanding the micro-level process 
The above sub-sections presented a theoretical framework for suspects’ micro-level 
decision-making process. To further facilitate understanding of this framework, I next 
present two hypothetical examples to illustrate how suspects evaluate the expected utility of a 
denial and a confession and make a decision between these two choices. Table 2 shows the 
mathematical expressions corresponding to the parameters involved in Equation 1. With 
these parameters, the expected utility of each choice can be evaluated. 
Table 2. Model parameters to evaluate expected utilities of a denial and a confession 
 
Proximal outcomes 
 
 
Distal outcomes 
(discount rate θ) 
Expected 
utility 
(-) (+)   (-) (+)  
Denial (D) 
𝑢 𝐷𝑝− ,  
𝑝(𝐷𝑝−) 
𝑢 𝐷𝑝+ , 
 𝑝(𝐷𝑝+) 
 
 
θ 
𝑢(𝐷𝑑−), 
𝑝(𝐷𝑑−) 
𝑢(𝐷𝑑+),  
𝑝(𝐷𝑑+) 
𝐸 𝑢(𝑫)  
Confession (C) 
𝑢 𝐶𝑝− ,  
𝑝(𝐶𝑝−) 
𝑢 𝐶𝑝+ , 
 𝑝(𝐶𝑝+) 
 
 
𝑢(𝐶𝑑−), 
𝑝(𝐶𝑑−) 
𝑢(𝐶𝑑+), 
 𝑝(𝐶𝑑+) 
𝐸 𝑢(𝑪)  
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In Table 2, a suspect’s perceived outcomes that follow a denial are denoted as 𝑫 =
 𝑫𝒑, 𝑫𝒅 =  (𝐷𝑝−, 𝐷𝑝+), (𝐷𝑑−, 𝐷𝑑+) . Similarly, the perceived outcomes that follow a 
confession are denoted as 𝑪 =  𝑪𝒑, 𝑪𝒅 =  (𝐶𝑝−, 𝐶𝑝+), (𝐶𝑑−, 𝐶𝑑+) . 𝑫𝒑 and 𝑪𝒑 represent the 
proximal outcomes that follow a denial and a confession, respectively; 𝑫𝒅 and 𝑪𝒅 represent 
the distal outcomes that follow a denial and a confession, respectively. Although there are 
usually multiple proximal and distal outcomes, in order to simplify the notations in each cell 
of Table 2, my examples treat all negative outcomes as a single outcome (i.e., 𝐷𝑝−, 𝐷𝑑− and 
𝐶𝑝−, 𝐶𝑑−) and all positive outcomes as a single outcome (i.e., 𝐷𝑝+, 𝐷𝑑+ and 𝐶𝑝+, 𝐶𝑑+). 
Therefore, with Equation 2 the expected utility of a denial can be expressed as,  
Equation 2. 
𝐸 𝑢(𝑫)  =   𝑝 𝐷𝑝− 𝑢 𝐷𝑝− + 𝑝(𝐷𝑝+)𝑢(𝐷𝑝+) +  𝜃 𝑝(𝐷𝑑−)𝑢(𝐷𝑑−) + 𝑝(𝐷𝑑+)𝑢(𝐷𝑑+)  
And similarly, with Equation 3 the expected utility of a confession can be expressed 
as,  
Equation 3. 
𝐸 𝑢(𝑪)  =   𝑝 𝐶𝑝− 𝑢 𝐶𝑝− + 𝑝(𝐶𝑝+)𝑢(𝐶𝑝+) +  𝜃 𝑝(𝐶𝑑−)𝑢(𝐶𝑑−) + 𝑝(𝐶𝑑+)𝑢(𝐶𝑑+)  
Table 3. Example 1: An innocent suspect’s subjective judgments. 
 
Proximal outcomes  Distal outcomes Expected 
utility 
(-) (+)  𝜃 (-) (+) 
Denial (D) 
−100, 
90% 
+100, 
10% 
 
 
0.1 
−10000, 
0% 
+100, 
100% 
−70 
Confession (C) 
−100, 
0% 
+100, 
100% 
 
 
−10000, 
50% 
+100, 
50% 
−395 
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Example 1: An innocent suspect is brought into an interrogation. This suspect’s 
perceptions of the utilities and probabilities of possible outcomes and the discount rate are 
quantified as in Table 3. For the purpose of simplicity, it is assumed that the proximal and 
distal outcomes considered by this suspect are the same for a denial and for a confession. The 
suspect perceives that the negative distal outcome of future conviction (with a utility of -
10000) are far more severe than the negative proximal outcome of being detained in the 
interrogation room (with a utility of -100). The suspect also perceives that the positive 
proximal outcome of escaping from the interrogation and the positive distal outcome of not 
being convicted in the future are equally desirable (each with a utility of +100). The 
probabilities of those outcomes, however, are different for a denial and a confession. For a 
denial, the suspect believes that there is a high risk of being detained in the uncomfortable 
confrontational situation (with a probability of 90%) but no risk of future conviction (0%). 
For a confession, the suspect anticipates ending the interrogation immediately (i.e., with a 
probability of experiencing the negative proximal outcome at 0%), while simultaneously 
believing that there is some chance that s/he will be convicted and punished in the future 
(with a probability of experiencing the negative distal outcome at 50%). Furthermore, the 
discount rate for the distal outcomes is set up as 0.1, indicating that this suspect will discount 
the distal outcomes to 10% in her or his decisions. 
Inserting these values into Equation 2 and 3 yields the expected utilities of a denial 
and a confession, respectively, 
𝐸 𝑢(𝑫)  =   −100 ∗ 90% + 100 ∗ 10% +  0.1 ∗  −10000 ∗ 0% + 100 ∗ 100% = −70 
𝐸 𝑢(𝑪)  =   −100 ∗ 0% + 100 ∗ 100% +  0.1 ∗  −10000 ∗ 50% + 100 ∗ 50% = −395 
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Because the expected utility of a denial (𝐸 𝑢(𝑫) = −70) is higher than that of a 
confession (𝐸 𝑢(𝑪) = −395), the model predicts that this suspect will choose to deny guilt 
at this time point. 
Table 4. Example 2: A guilty suspect’s subjective judgments. 
 
Proximal outcomes  Distal outcomes Expected 
utility 
(-) (+)  𝜃 (-) (+) 
Denial (D) 
−100, 
90% 
+100, 
10% 
 
 
0.1 
−10000, 
90% 
+100, 
10% 
−979 
Confession (C) 
−100, 
0% 
+100, 
100% 
 
 
−10000, 
100% 
+100, 
0% 
−900 
 
Example 2: Let us consider another example of an interrogated suspect who is guilty 
of the crime. Suppose that perceptions of the utilities of all possible outcomes and the 
discount rate are the same for the guilty suspect as they were for the innocent suspect in the 
aforementioned example, but the probabilities of the outcomes are different (as shown in 
Table 4). Being aware of other evidence collected by police investigators confirming her or 
his guilt, the guilty suspect believes that future punishment is highly probable even if s/he 
denies culpability (with a probability of experiencing the negative distal outcome at 90%). 
This suspect also believes that if s/he chooses to confess, it is with absolute certainty that s/he 
will be convicted in the future (with a probability of 100%). Therefore, the suspect can 
evaluate the expected utilities of a denial and a confession as follows, 
𝐸 𝑢(𝑫)  =   −100 ∗ 90% + 100 ∗ 10% +  0.1 ∗  −10000 ∗ 90% + 100 ∗ 10% = −979 
𝐸 𝑢(𝑪)  =   −100 ∗ 0% + 100 ∗ 100% +  0.1 ∗  −10000 ∗ 100% + 100 ∗ 0% = −900 
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Because the expected utility of a confession (𝐸 𝑢(𝑪) = −900) is higher than that of 
a denial (𝐸 𝑢(𝑫) = −979), the model predicts that this suspect will choose to confess at 
this time point. 
The above hypothetical examples illustrate how the interrogation decision-making 
model can be used to understand suspects’ micro-level decision-making process during an 
interrogation. Simply put, the model suggests that interrogated suspects make the decision to 
either deny or confess guilt on the basis of comparing the expected utilities of their choices. 
In particular, suspects evaluate the expected utility of a choice in terms of the utilities and 
probabilities of its proximal and distal outcomes, and suspects naturally discount distal 
outcomes in this process. 
Macro-Level Process: A Holistic View of an Interrogation 
During an interrogation, suspects seldom make just one decision; instead, they 
usually make a series of decisions—at first denials and at last perhaps a confession. Taking a 
holistic point of view, the macro-level process of the model takes into account suspects’ 
multiple decisions across the entire course of an interrogation and examines changes in their 
interrogation decisions over time. In other words, the macro-level process corresponds to the 
entire flow of suspects’ decision-making process throughout an interrogation, including how 
their decisions change over time and what factors may influence these changes.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The macro-level process of suspects’ decision-making during an interrogation. The 
symbol Δ represents changes during an interrogation. 
Δ Δ Initial status 
Denial 
Updated status 
Denial 
Δ Δ Final status 
Confession 
Updated status 
Denial 
… 
Time 0 Time 1 Time (n-1) Time n 
… 
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Figure 2 shows a hypothetical example of the macro-level process of suspects’ 
decision-making. At the beginning of an interrogation, a suspect may be apt to deny guilt. As 
the interrogation continues, however, the suspects' internal status may change. For instance, 
the suspect's knowledge about the crime may change, stress level may increase, and 
resistance to social influence may decrease. As a result, the suspect may become more and 
more reluctant to deny guilt, and eventually switch and decide to confess guilt.  
A great many factors can operate in the macro-level process and influence suspects' 
decision-making. These macro-level factors serve as the starting step for the micro-level 
process of each interrogation decision, influencing the information that suspects use to 
construct their subjective judgments. These macro-level factors can be classified into three 
categories according to their relevance to the elements of an interrogation. One class of 
macro-level factors varies at the level of the interrogated suspect including, suspects’ 
personality traits, intelligence level, general knowledge about the legal system, as well as 
factual innocence versus guilt, etc. A second class of macro-level factors varies at the level of 
the crime under investigation. Included in this class of factors are the type of the crime (e.g., 
murder versus larceny) and the perceived seriousness of the crime. The third class of macro-
level factors varies at the level of the interrogation situation, including various police 
interrogation techniques, features of the interrogation room, characteristics of police 
interrogator(s), etc. 
This categorization of the three classes of macro-level factors reflects different levels 
of variability introduced by different elements of an interrogation. For example, suspect 
factors are relevant to understanding population differences in confessions, i.e., the inter-
individual differences; crime factors are relevant to understanding crime differences in 
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confessions, i.e., the inter-crime differences; and interrogation factors are relevant to 
understanding chronological changes in the decision-making process within the same suspect 
for the same crime, i.e., the intra-individual differences. The three classes of factors can also 
interact with each other. For example, the same police interrogation technique may have 
different effects on juvenile versus adults, minority versus non-minority, and suspects with 
criminal records versus those without (Leo, 1996). 
Correspondingly, these factors play different roles in suspects’ decision-making 
process. Across the entire course of an interrogation, suspect factors and crime factors are 
usually constant and do not change over time. Therefore, their effects on suspects’ decision-
making are stable. For example, suspects’ age, intelligence, factual innocence or guilt, and 
the characteristics of the crime should, according to the model, exert a constant effect on 
suspects’ decision-making during an interrogation. Interrogation factors, however, are 
variable and, therefore, can alter suspects’ decision-making dynamically during an 
interrogation. For example, police interrogators can establish different interrogation 
techniques at different time points, thereby leading suspects to change their decisions. 
When examining the macro-level process depicted in Figure 2, it can be noted that the 
constant factors, including suspect and crime factors, determine suspects’ initial status during 
the macro-level process; this initial status continuously serves as the baseline status across 
the entire interrogation. Meanwhile, the variable factors, particularly the police interrogation 
techniques, update suspects’ status by introducing changes into the macro-level process. 
These changes are marked with the symbol “Δ” in Figure 2. As the effects of these variable 
factors cumulate, suspects may eventually change their interrogation decision from a denial 
to a confession.  
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In summary, the macro-level process of the model explains how suspects’ decision-
making changes over the course of an interrogation. Taking a holistic view, it accounts for 
the dynamic nature of an interrogation by highlighting that the factors in the model are all 
potential functions of time. This characteristic enables the model to account for situations in 
which suspects may make a series of decisions throughout the course of an interrogation. 
Connecting Micro- and Macro-Level Processes 
The above sections have described two complementary processes—a micro-level 
process and a macro-level process—that jointly explain how suspects arrive at their 
interrogation decisions. Whereas the micro-level process explains how suspects decide 
whether to deny or confess guilt at a single point in time during an interrogation, the macro-
level process explains how suspects’ decision-making changes over the course of an 
interrogation.  
 
Figure 3. This figure illustrates a hypothetical example of suspects’ decision-making during 
a custodial interrogation. It combines the micro- and macro-level processes together. Each 
column in the vertical direction indicates the micro-level process underlying a single 
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interrogation decision. Among these, the dashed rectangle gives one example of the micro-
level process for a decision made at time 1. The top and bottom rows in the horizontal 
direction indicate the macro-level process of suspects’ interrogation decisions. The symbol Δ 
represents the dynamic change that happens during an interrogation, for example, the 
implementation of an interrogation technique.  
The example in Figure 3 illustrates the connection between the micro- and macro-
level processes and shows how they jointly explain suspects’ interrogation decisions. In the 
figure, the columns in the vertical direction present the micro-level processes underlying the 
interrogation decisions that suspects make at different time points. The dashed rectangular 
box indicates one such process for the decision at time 1 (also see Figure 1). The top and 
bottom rows in the horizontal direction together present the macro-level process of suspects’ 
decision-making (also see Figure 2). 
This example indicates that the micro- and macro-level processes are interconnected. 
On the one hand, the micro-level process reveals how suspects make a single interrogation 
decision and constitutes the basic building blocks for the macro-level process. As shown in 
Figure 3, when aligning multiple micro-level processes in sequence, their inputs and outputs 
compose suspects’ macro-level decision-making process. On the other hand, the macro-level 
process describes suspects’ multiple decisions throughout an interrogation and provides 
contextual information for the micro-level process. At different time points, the factors from 
the macro-level process influence suspects’ subjective evaluations of their choices, thereby 
acting as the starting step for the micro-level process. Integrating the micro- and macro-level 
processes, the interrogation decision-making model captures the whole picture of suspects’ 
decision-making process with a custodial interrogation.  
As discussed above, different classes of factors play different roles in suspects’ 
decision-making. The constant factors, including the characteristics of the suspect and 
features of the crime, provide the same baseline information for each of the micro-level 
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process. The variable factors, particularly the interrogation techniques, provide updates to the 
starting step of the micro-level process and cause changes to suspects’ decisions over time. 
With the framework of the interrogation decision-making model, it is possible to analyze 
how factors in the macro-level process influence the parameters involved in the micro-level 
process of suspects’ decision-making, thereby explaining their effects on suspects’ 
interrogation decisions. 
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CHAPTER 3. MODEL APPLICATIONS 
The interrogation decision-making model provides a theoretical framework to 
understand suspects’ decision-making process within the context of a custodial interrogation. 
This chapter discusses the applications of the model to explain major research findings 
relevant to suspects’ confessions that have been reported in the literature. The first section 
discusses how the model explains the population differences in confession rates, including 
suspects’ age, criminal history, and factual innocence versus guilt. The second section 
discusses how the model explains the effects of various interrogation techniques on suspects’ 
decision-making. The last section discusses the cumulative effects of interrogation 
techniques on suspects’ decisions to deny or confess guilt. Model parameters are referenced 
using the same notations indicated in Table 2, where D denotes the choice of a denial and C 
denotes the choice of a confession. 
Population Differences 
It is well established that the confession rate varies across different populations. It has 
been revealed, for example, that both the true and false confession rate are higher among 
juveniles than adults (Redlich & Drizin, 2007), higher among those with cognitive 
disabilities than those without (Cloud et al., 2002; Meyer & Reppucci, 2007), higher among 
first-time offenders than recidivists (Gudjonsson, Sigurdsson, & Einarsson, 2004; Pearse, 
Gudjonsson, Clare, & Rutter, 1998), and higher among guilty than innocent suspects 
(Gudjonsson, 2003; Leo, 1996). As discussed next, the interrogation decision-making model 
explains population differences in terms of pre-existing variations in model parameters. 
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Juvenile and cognitively disabled 
Both juvenile and cognitively disabled suspects tend to be impulsive and short-
sighted in their confession decisions (Owen-Kostelnik et al., 2006; Redlich, 2007). For 
adolescents, the immaturity in brain development, especially the frontal cortex, leads to 
impulsivity and lack of self-control in performing cognitive tasks, including making 
decisions (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000). For suspects with a cognitive disability, low 
intelligence may limit their executive functions of taking the future into consideration 
(Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). These characteristics may lead youth and the cognitively 
disabled to more strongly discount the future, thereby increasing their risk of confessing 
during an interrogation.  
The discount rate, θ, shown in Equation 1, explains this pre-existing vulnerability. As 
the discount rate, θ, gets smaller, that is, as the tendency to discount the future increases, 
distal outcomes have less influence on suspects’ decisions to deny or confess guilt. This 
means that suspects with a smaller discount rate (i.e., a stronger tendency to discount the 
future) are more strongly influenced by proximal outcomes than suspects with a higher 
discount rate. Consequently, suspects with a smaller discount rate may be inclined to 
perceive a confession as a more optimal choice than a denial. This may explain the high 
(false) confession rate among juvenile and cognitively disabled suspects. Compared with 
adults of normal intelligence, juveniles and those with cognitive disabilities may apply a 
smaller discount rate, θ, in their decision-making processes. 
Recidivists versus first-time offenders 
Suspects’ knowledge about the legal system plays an important role in their 
evaluation of distal outcomes. Suspects with significant knowledge and experiences about the 
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legal procedures and sanctions tend to have more accurate judgments on the possible 
outcomes following a confession (Gudjonsson, 2003). Because this knowledge represents an 
advantage, recidivists may be more cognizant of the deterministic power of a confession than 
are suspects who have little to no knowledge about the legal system. Thus, whereas 
recidivists may perceive a confession as greatly increasing their risk of conviction, first-time 
offenders may perceive a confession as having little to no effect on their risk of conviction. 
Furthermore, recidivists may be more likely to realize the severity of potential legal sanctions 
than first-time offenders. According to the model, a confession may, therefore, generate 
higher expected utility for first-time offenders than recidivists. As a result, it can be predicted 
that first-time offenders might be more likely to perceive a confession as the optimal choice 
than recidivists.  
More importantly, general knowledge about the legal system can even change 
suspects’ decision space from the outset. Suspects who are knowledgeable about their legal 
rights may, for instance, invoke Miranda before being subjected to an interrogation. In other 
words, the decision space can be widened or narrowed to accommodate choices other than a 
denial and a confession depending on suspects’ knowledge about their legal rights. 
Factual innocence versus guilt 
Both observational and experimental research has shown that guilty suspects are more 
likely than innocent suspects to confess during an interrogation (Guyll et al., 2013; Leo, 
Costanzo, & Shaked-Schroer, 2009; Russano et al., 2005). Table 5 lists four major 
differences in the perceptions of possible outcomes between innocent and guilty suspects in 
terms of the model’s parameters. Among the four differences, three are relevant to 
understanding why guilty suspects are more likely to confess than innocent suspects. The 
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remaining difference is relevant to understanding innocent suspects’ vulnerability to false 
confessions. 
Table 5. Differences in subjective judgments between innocent and guilty suspects 
  
Proximal outcomes  Distal outcomes 
Denial (D) 
Guilty: Anxiety from deception, 
feelings of guilt and remorse. 
 
Innocent: No anxiety or feeling of guilt. 
 
 
 
Guilty: High risk of future conviction. 
 
Innocent: No risk of future conviction. 
Confession (C) 
 
Guilty: Relief from deception. 
 
Innocent: Negative emotions. 
 
 
 
Guilty: Certainty of future conviction. 
 
Innocent: Low risk of future conviction. 
Note. The differences in the perceptions of the proximal outcomes of both choices and the 
distal outcomes of a denial are relevant to guilty suspects’ tendency to confess. The 
difference in the perceived probability of the distal outcomes of a confession is relevant to 
innocent suspects’ tendency to confess.  
 
Suspects’ factual innocence or guilt can lead to differences in their perceptions of 
proximal outcomes. Consider, for instance, the perceived proximal outcomes following a 
denial. Compared with innocent suspects, guilty suspects who consider denying guilt may 
anticipate experiencing anxiety and stress as well as guilt and remorse (Gudjonsson, 2003). 
Thus, the utility of the proximal outcomes following a denial, 𝑢 𝐷𝑝− , may be more negative 
for guilty suspects than innocent suspects. The perceived proximal outcomes of a confession 
can also differ between innocent and guilty suspects. Whereas innocent suspects may 
anticipate feeling strong negative emotions following a confession due to the betrayal of their 
innocence, guilty suspects may anticipate a catharsis after admitting guilt (Gudjonsson, 
2003). Therefore, the utility of the proximal outcomes following a confession, 𝑢 𝐶𝑝− , may 
be more negative for innocent suspects than guilty suspects. In addition, the perceived 
probability of distal outcomes following a denial (i.e., 𝑝(𝐷𝑑−)) can also differ between the 
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two groups. Compared with innocent suspects, guilty suspects may perceive future 
punishment as highly likely even if they deny guilt, presumably because future evidence will 
be collected to confirm their guilt and thus ensure a conviction. As a result of these pre-
existing differences, guilty suspects may be more inclined than innocent suspects to offer a 
confession during an interrogation. 
Although generally speaking, guilty suspects are more likely to confess than innocent 
suspects, there is one feature inherent in innocent suspects’ perceived probability of the distal 
outcomes following a confession (i.e., 𝑝(𝐶𝑑−)) that may make them particularly vulnerable 
to giving a false confession. According to the phenomenology of innocence, innocent 
suspects tend to believe that their innocence will be apparent to others and that it will protect 
them from experiencing legal sanctions (Kassin, 2005). In terms of the model’s parameters, 
the perception that factual innocence is sufficient to protect them from harm means that 
innocent suspects may tend to perceive the negative distal outcomes associated with a 
confession to have a low probability, that is, 𝑝(𝐶𝑑−) is small. Consider, for example, the 
opening case of Jeffrey Deskovic. Jeffrey falsely confessed on the basis of the naïve belief 
that his innocence was sufficient to protect him from conviction. “I thought it was all going 
to be O.K. in the end”, he said (Santo, 2006, para. 18). Jeffrey’s reasoning illustrates how 
innocent suspects may perceive future punishment following their confessions as particularly 
improbable—a misperception that may increase innocent suspects’ willingness to confess 
(Kassin, 2005, 2012). 
Interrogation Techniques 
In the dynamic process of an interrogation, police interrogation techniques can 
manipulate suspects’ perceptions of the possible outcomes following a denial and a 
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confession so as to alter their decisions. With the interrogation decision-making model, it is 
possible to analyze the information delivered by a specific police interrogation technique, 
examine its effect on the specific model parameter(s) to which it corresponds, and 
subsequently understand its influence on suspects’ interrogation decisions. 
Techniques affecting expected utility of a confession 
Minimization techniques manipulate suspects’ perceptions of proximal and distal 
outcomes following a confession. Rapport building, offering sympathy and understanding, 
and minimizing the seriousness of the crime encourage suspects to expect that a confession 
will produce more positive, proximal outcomes (e.g., social approval) and less negative, 
distal outcomes (e.g., leniency). In terms of the model’s parameters, increases in 𝑢 𝐶𝑝+  and 
𝑢(𝐶𝑑−) cause 𝐸 𝑢(𝑪)  to increase, meaning that suspects' tendency to confess increases. 
Table 6. Effects of interrogation techniques on suspects’ decision-making. 
  
Proximal outcomes  Distal outcomes 
Denial (D) 
Isolation, sleep and food 
deprivation: 𝑢 𝐷𝑝−  ↓ 
Maximization techniques: 
 Intimidating, anger: 𝑢 𝐷𝑝−  ↓ 
 
 
 
 
Maximization techniques: 
 Exaggerate consequences: 
𝑢(𝐷𝑑−) ↓ 
 False evidence: 𝑝(𝐷𝑑−) ↑ 
Bluff (guilty): 𝑝(𝐷𝑑−) ↑ 
Confession 
(C) 
Minimization techniques:  
 Rapport building, sympathy: 
𝑢 𝐶𝑝+  ↑ 
 
 
Minimization techniques:  
 Minimize seriousness of crime: 
𝑢(𝐶𝑑−) ↑ 
Bluff (innocent): 𝑝(𝐶𝑑−) ↓ 
 
Techniques affecting expected utility of a denial 
Some interrogation techniques manipulate suspects’ perceptions of proximal 
outcomes following a denial. One of the most straightforward examples that falls into this 
category is highly aversive and coercive interrogation techniques, such as physical isolation, 
sleep and food deprivation, and drug withdrawal. This set of practices directly affects 
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suspects’ judgments of the utility of proximal outcomes. For example, once deprived of food, 
sleep or drugs, suspects may perceive the negative proximal outcomes of a denial as more 
difficult to endure in the interrogation room than they had initially. In terms of the model’s 
parameters, 𝑢 𝐷𝑝−  becomes more negative in suspects’ perceptions. As a result, the 
expected utility of a denial, 𝐸 𝑢(𝑫) , will drop off, which means that suspects are 
discouraged from denying guilt. In other words, according to the model, highly aversive and 
coercive interrogation techniques pull for a confession because they change suspects’ 
perceived utility of proximal outcomes following a denial. 
Maximization techniques can influence suspects’ perceptions of both proximal and 
distal outcomes following a denial. Intimidating suspects, expressing anger, or threatening 
suspects with severe legal consequences if they do not “cooperate” with the police, for 
example, encourages suspects to expect that a denial will produce negative proximal 
outcomes (e.g., social disapproval) and negative distal outcomes (e.g., harsh sentence). In 
terms of the model’s parameters, 𝑢 𝐷𝑝−  and 𝑢(𝐷𝑑−) become more negative. As a result, 
𝐸 𝑢(𝑫)  will reduce, which indicates that suspects are discouraged from denying guilt. 
Some maximization techniques manipulate the perceived probability of distal 
outcomes following a denial. For example, police are allowed to present suspects with false 
evidence, such as the result of a rigged forensic test or a staged eyewitness identification 
(Kassin et al., 2007; Perillo & Kassin, 2011). False evidence causes suspects to perceive that 
the probability of conviction is high even without a confession. In terms of the model, 
𝑝(𝐷𝑑−) increases and 𝐸 𝑢(𝑫)  will consequently decline, which is moving suspects away 
from a denial. As predicted by the model, research has demonstrated that false evidence 
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increases the false confession rate in both laboratory experiments and actual cases (Firstman 
& Salpeter, 2008; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). 
Bluff technique 
The bluff technique is listed separately because its effects on suspects’ evaluations of 
a denial and a confession depend on the population to which it is applied. According to some 
accounts (e.g., Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2011), this technique was originally designed 
to reduce the chance that innocent suspects would falsely confess. However, empirical 
research has not supported this claim: Although the bluff technique does increase the 
likelihood that guilty suspects will confess, it has the same effect on innocent suspects 
(Perillo & Kassin, 2011). Thus, it does not improve surgical precision.  
The interrogation decision-making model can explain why. The bluff technique 
causes suspects to believe that evidence will be examined to show whether or not they are 
guilty of the crime. To the extent that guilty suspects are duped by this bluff, they should 
expect the evidence to confirm their guilt, thereby causing them to believe that conviction is 
likely no matter their choices during the interrogation. In other words, guilty suspects, 
believing there will be strong evidence against them, should perceive the chances of 
conviction to be high, even if they keep denying guilt. In terms of the model, 𝑝(𝐷𝑑−) 
increases and thus 𝐸 𝑢(𝑫)  will decrease. Therefore, a guilty suspect is likely to confess 
when confronted with the bluff technique.  
For innocent suspects the decision is the same, but the process is different: To the 
extent that innocent suspects are duped by the bluff, they will expect the evidence to prove 
their innocence, thereby causing them to believe that acquittal is likely no matter their 
choices during the interrogation. Accordingly, innocent suspects, believing there will be 
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strong evidence of their innocence, should perceive the chances of conviction to be low, even 
if they offer a confession. In terms of the model, 𝑝(𝐶𝑑−) decreases and thus 𝐸 𝑢(𝑪)  will 
increase. Therefore, an innocent suspect is also likely to confess with the bluff technique. 
Although the processes are different, the ultimate effects of the bluff technique are the same 
for innocent and guilty suspects, pushing both towards confessions. 
Cumulative effects 
During an interrogation, police may utilize multiple interrogation techniques. As 
these techniques are implemented, suspects incorporate the information delivered by police 
into their decision-making process. Thus, the use of interrogation techniques at varying 
points of time can lead suspects to vary decision-making parameters with time, thereby 
causing the decision-making process to be dynamic rather than static throughout an 
interrogation. Accordingly, the effects of different interrogation techniques can accumulate 
and continually influence suspects’ evaluation of a denial and a confession. According to the 
model, a combination of techniques will more strongly influence suspects’ decisions than any 
individual technique alone, an effect supported by prior research (Russano et al., 2005). 
These cumulative changes are reflected in Figure 4. 
The model explains this cumulative process in terms of suspects’ changing 
evaluations of the expected utilities of a denial and a confession. According to the model, 
suspects continually re-evaluate whether they should deny or confess guilt at the same time 
that police interrogation techniques are influencing the expected utilities of these choices. 
This means, therefore, that suspects’ evaluations of the expected utilities of a denial and a 
confession are continuously changing. Because of the nature of police interrogation 
techniques, their cumulative effects are expected to progressively reduce the expected utility 
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of a denial while progressively increasing the expected utility of a confession. Flipping from 
a denial to a confession, therefore, becomes just a matter of time. Of course, not all 
interrogations will last long enough or be coercive enough to produce this flip, but 
theoretically, if an interrogation lasts long enough, or is especially coercive, then all or nearly 
all suspects would be expected to flip their decision from a denial to a confession at some 
point during the interrogation. 
 
Figure 4. A hypothetical example of cumulative effects of interrogation techniques. The 
solid line presents a suspect’s evaluation of the expected utility of a denial; the dashed line 
presents the suspect’s evaluation of the expected utility of a confession. 
 
It is also worthwhile to point out that this hypothesized process may take longer for 
innocent suspects than guilty suspects. Because the initial discrepancy between the expected 
utilities of a denial and a confession may be larger for innocent suspects than guilty suspects, 
it may take innocent suspects longer than guilty suspects to reach their “breaking point”—the 
point at which suspects decide that the expected utility of a confession is large enough to flip 
from a denial to a confession. That may account for the extraordinary length of interrogations 
in documented false confession cases. Among a sample of proven false confessors, more than 
80% were interrogated for more than 6 hours, and about 50% were interrogated for more than 
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12 hours (Drizin & Leo, 2004), and, the average length of these interrogations was 16.3 
hours, which is strikingly long compared with a typical interrogation, which lasts no more 
than 2 hours (Cassell & Hayman, 1996; Kassin et al., 2007; Leo, 1996).  
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
Two experiments tested key predictions of the interrogation decision-making model. 
The predictions pertain to the way that an outcome’s utility influences suspects’ confession 
decisions. Experiment 1 focused on the utility of a proximal outcome, whereas Experiment 2 
focused on the utility of a distal outcome. 
According to the interrogation decision-making model, the utility of proximal 
outcomes that follow from suspects’ choices to deny or confess guilt is a key factor that 
influences their decision-making process. In particular, police interrogators may manipulate 
suspects’ perceived utility of proximal outcomes with various interrogation practices, such as 
physical isolation, extended interrogation, and food and sleep deprivations. Therefore, it is 
important to examine the effect of a proximal outcome’s utility on suspects’ confession 
decisions. To achieve this goal, Experiment 1 directly manipulated the perceived utility of a 
proximal outcome and examined its influence on participants’ admission decisions. 
Consistent with the interrogation decision-making model, it was hypothesized that the 
proximal outcome would have a stronger influence on participants’ admission decisions the 
more negatively it was perceived. 
The interrogation decision-making model also proposes that the utility of distal 
outcomes that follow from suspects’ choices to deny or confess guilt is another key factor 
that influences their decision-making process. A great many interrogation techniques work to 
elicit confessions because they directly manipulate suspects’ perceptions of the utility of 
distal outcomes. As discussed in Chapter 3, minimization techniques may lead suspects to 
expect the utility of distal outcomes of a confession to become less negative, thereby 
encouraging suspects to confess. And maximization techniques may lead suspects to expect 
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the utility of distal outcomes of a denial to become more negative, thereby discouraging 
suspects from denying. Therefore, it is also important to examine the effect of a distal 
outcome’s utility on suspects’ confession decisions. To achieve this goal, Experiment 2 
directly manipulated the perceived utility of a distal outcome and examined its influence on 
participants’ admission decisions. On the basis of the interrogation decision-making model, it 
was hypothesized that the distal outcome would have a stronger influence on participants’ 
admission decisions the more negatively it was perceived. 
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CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENT 1 
The first experiment tested the hypothesis that a proximal outcome’s effect on 
suspects’ interrogation decisions is larger the more negatively the proximal outcome is 
perceived. Experiment 1 tested this prediction using the repetitive question paradigm 
(Madon, et al., 2012). Participants were interviewed about 20 prior illegal and unethical 
behaviors and were required to admit or deny each one. A contingency pairing manipulation 
paired these responses with a proximal outcome (answering a set of repetitive questions) and 
a distal outcome (to meet with a police officer to discuss their responses in a few weeks). 
Specifically, for some participants, denials were paired with a proximal outcome and 
admissions were paired with a distal outcome whereas for others admissions were paired 
with a proximal outcome and denials were paired with a distal outcome. Experiment 1 also 
manipulated the utility of the proximal outcome by having participants eat either a pleasant-
flavored jelly bean (less negative) or an unpleasant-flavored jelly bean (more negative) each 
time they experienced the proximal outcome of the repetitive questions.  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 210 participants were recruited from the Psychology Department’s research 
participant pool at Iowa State University. Participants took part in the study to satisfy a 
course requirement. Five participants were excluded from the analyses because they were not 
native English speakers. Therefore, the final sample consisted of 205 participants. In the final 
sample, 55.6% participants were female. The mean age was 19.4 (SD = 1.5). Participants 
included 184 Caucasians, four Asians, seven African Americans, four Latina/o, one Indian, 
five who self-described as multi-ethnic, and two who did not indicate her or his ethnicity. 
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Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (Contingency pairing: denial-proximal 
outcome vs. admission-proximal outcome) × 2 (Negative utility of proximal outcome: low 
vs. high) between-subjects experimental design. All participants were interviewed about 20 
prior criminal and unethical behaviors and were required to admit or deny each one.  
Contingency pairing varied the outcomes that participants faced for denials and 
admissions of these behaviors. In the “denial-proximal outcome” contingency pairing 
condition (n = 104), participants faced a negative proximal outcome for each denial and a 
negative distal outcome for admissions. This situation parallels the situation experienced by 
interrogated suspects in the sense that each denial results in an immediate (proximal) 
punishment but reduces the likelihood of a future (distal) punishment, whereas each 
admission results in the avoidance of an immediate (proximal) punishment but increases the 
likelihood of a future (distal) punishment. In the “admission-proximal outcome” contingency 
pairing condition (n = 101), these contingencies were reversed. These participants faced a 
negative proximal outcome for each admission and a negative distal outcome for denials. In 
both contingency pairing conditions, the proximal outcome was answering a set of 32 
repetitive questions and the distal outcome was meeting with a police officer in several 
weeks to discuss their interview responses in greater detail. Even though participants could 
avoid answering the repetitive questions by giving the alternative response rather than the 
one that was paired with the proximal outcome (e.g., an admission from participants who 
received the proximal outcome for each denial), they were led to believe that doing so would 
increase their risk of encountering the distal outcome, which was to meet with a police 
officer in several weeks. 
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Negative utility of proximal outcome varied the aversiveness of the proximal 
outcome. This was accomplished by having participants eat either pleasant or unpleasant-
flavored jelly beans while answering the repetitive questions. In the low negative utility 
condition (n = 101), participants ate a pleasant-flavored jelly bean (i.e., very cherry) each and 
every time they were required to answer the set of repetitive questions. In the high negative 
utility condition (n = 104), participants ate an unpleasant-flavored jelly bean (i.e., stinky 
socks) each and every time they were required to answer the set of repetitive questions. This 
experimental manipulation was expected to vary participants’ perception of the proximal 
outcome’s utility: Participants who had to eat the unpleasant-flavored jelly bean were 
expected to perceive the proximal outcome to be more negative than those who ate the 
pleasant-flavored jelly beans. 
In addition to the experimental manipulations of contingency pairing and negative 
utility of proximal outcome, I also counterbalanced the orders of the 20 illegal and unethical 
behaviors included in the interview. A total of 40 orders were created within each of the four 
experimental cells: Half of the orders were created by shifting one question down to the 
bottom of the interview survey sequentially; the other half first reversed the order of the 
questions and then used the shifting strategy to create 20 more versions. Therefore, 
participants received different orders of the illegal behavior interview, although the questions 
themselves were the same. 
Materials 
Interview questions. The interview questions assessed whether or not participants 
had ever engaged in 20 illegal (e.g., transporting fireworks across state lines) and unethical 
(e.g., starting or spreading a rumor about someone) behaviors (Appendix B). Participants 
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responded ‘yes’ (coded as 1) or ‘no’ (coded as 0) to each question. The 20 interview 
questions were developed on the basis of a pilot study in which participants (a) admitted or 
denied 53 illegal and unethical behaviors and (b) rated the seriousness of each behavior 
(Madon et al., 2013). The order of the questions was matched for seriousness and 
counterbalanced to eliminate potential order effects. 
Repetitive question set. Thirty-two repetitive questions were included in the set 
(Appendix C). These questions assessed participants’ perceptions about how the “average 
Iowan” and “average American” would feel (e.g., hostile, guilty) when engaging in the 
illegal or unethical behavior about which participants just admitted or denied, depending on 
the contingency pairing condition to which they were assigned. Participants answered the 
repetitive questions on a computer that was programmed with a 4-second delay between each 
question. The set required approximately 7 minutes to complete. Because the repetitive 
questions were unrelated to the hypothesis in the study, and were developed simply to 
provide participants with a proximal outcome, participants’ responses to the repetitive 
questions were not recorded. 
Suspicion check. Participants were probed for suspicion with questions that asked 
them whether they believed that they had been misled in any way during the experiment and 
if so, to describe how (Appendix D). All responses were examined to identify participants 
who were suspicious about the veracity of the meeting with the police officer. 
Contingency pairing check. To examine participants’ understanding of the 
contingency pairing, they were asked under which condition they were required to answer the 
repetitive questions (Appendix E). The response options were (a) “When I gave a ‘NO’ 
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response,” (b) “When I gave a ‘YES’ response,” and (c) “Sometimes when I gave a ‘NO’ 
response and sometimes when I gave a ‘YES’ response”. 
Negative utility manipulation check. Because the proximal outcome is composed of 
two components—eating jelly beans as well as answering repetitive questions, participants’ 
perceptions of the proximal outcome’s utility was assessed with three sets of questions 
(Appendix F). One set of questions assessed participants’ perceptions of the jelly beans. 
Three items in this set used bipolar adjectives that followed the question stem “The jelly 
beans were (1) bad – good; (2) unpleasant – pleasant; (3) disgusting – delicious”. The fourth 
item in this set asked participants “How much were you looking forward to eating a jelly 
bean?” , with the endpoints 1 (not at all) and 7 (a lot).  
The second set of questions assessed participants’ perception of the repetitive 
questions. Five items in this set used bipolar adjectives that followed the question stem “The 
additional questions about Iowans and Americans are (1) irritating – soothing; (2) repetitive 
– varied; (3) boring – interesting; (4) unpleasant – pleasant; (5) annoying – enjoyable”. 
Participants were also asked, “How much were you looking forward to answering the 
additional questions about Iowans and Americans?”, with the endpoints 1 (not at all) and 7 
(a lot). The last item in this set assessed participants’ overall perception of the proximal 
outcome by asking them “How glad were you when the illegal behavior interview was 
completely done?”, with the endpoints 1 (not at all glad) and 7 (very glad). 
Interview room and cover story 
All participants were interviewed individually in a small room that included a desk, a 
personal computer, and two chairs—one for the participant and the other for the 
experimenter. Next to the computer was a pencil vase that held two pencils with “Ames 
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Police Department” printed on them. In addition, two colored flyers were affixed to the wall 
directly above the computer monitor. These flyers offered safety tips for crime prevention. 
One flyer was obtained from the website of the university’s Department of Public Safety and 
had a university logo printed on it. The other flyer was obtained from the website of the 
Ames Police Department and had a police department emblem printed on it. These props 
supported the cover story that the experiment was a partnership between professors in the 
Psychology Department and law enforcement personnel and that it was designed to examine 
the rate of illegal behavior among college students. In addition, in order to conceal the true 
purpose of the jelly beans, participants were told that the study was also interested in the 
relationship between judgments and sugar consumption. 
Procedures 
Each participant was interviewed individually about 20 prior illegal and unethical 
behaviors. After obtaining informed consent, the experimenter provided the participant with 
the cover story and explained the contingency pairing with a prepared script. As shown 
below, the contents of the script were the same across experimental conditions except for 
select words (shown in the parentheses) that served to reverse the contingency pairing. 
 “I’m going to ask you some yes/no questions that will assess whether or 
not you’ve ever engaged in a variety of illegal and unethical behaviors. 
Every time you answer NO (YES) to one of these questions, you’ll be asked 
some additional follow-up questions in order to get some more information. 
You’ll answer these additional questions on the computer during your 
session today. On the other hand, if you tend to answer YES (NO) to the 
questions I ask you, then I will sign you up to meet with one of the police 
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officers involved in this research to discuss your answers in more detail. 
We’re doing this to get more information about people’s illegal behavior. 
So, let’s see…you would meet with Officer Schiller. Assuming that your 
score requires that you have this meeting, he would contact you in the next 
few weeks to set things up. These appointments have generally lasted about 
an hour. So, basically, if you answer YES (NO) a lot, you’ll need to meet 
with Officer Schiller.” 
Immediately after reciting the above script, the experimenter interviewed the 
participant about his or her prior illegal and unethical behaviors. Participants in the “denial-
proximal outcome” contingency pairing condition ate a jelly bean and then answered the set 
of 32 repetitive questions each and every time they denied one of the behaviors, whereas 
participants in the “admission-proximal outcome” contingency pairing condition ate a jelly 
bean and then answered the set of 32 repetitive questions each and every time they admitted 
to one of the behaviors. In the low negative utility condition, participants ate jelly beans with 
a pleasant flavor (very cherry). In the high negative utility condition, participants ate jelly 
beans with an unpleasant flavor (stinky socks). Though participants could avoid the proximal 
outcome of the jelly beans and repetitive questions by giving the alternative interview 
response (e.g., an admission from participants who received the proximal outcome for each 
denial), they were led to believe that doing so would increase their risk of the distal outcome 
of having to meet with the police officer in several weeks. 
Following the interview, participants completed self-report questionnaires that 
assessed demographic information, suspicion, and their understanding on the experimental 
manipulations, after which they were debriefed.  
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Preliminary Analyses 
Suspicion and contingency pairing checks 
 Examination of participants’ responses to the suspicion question revealed that there 
was one participant who doubted the veracity of the meeting with the police officer. In 
addition, a frequency analysis indicated that three participants did not correctly report the 
contingency pairing that was associated with their interview responses. The results of the 
main analyses below suggested that excluding these participants did not influence the pattern 
of the results. Therefore, I included these participants’ data in the analyses. 
Negative utility manipulation check 
Because the negative utility manipulation check items were not normally distributed, 
Ws ≤ 0.91, ps < 0.001, I performed the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests to examine 
participants’ perceptions of the proximal outcome (Appendix F). Table 7 lists the descriptive 
statistics of participants’ responses to the negative utility manipulation check items. 
First, I examined participants’ perceptions of the jelly beans. Results indicated that 
participants who had the unpleasant-flavored jelly beans rated the jelly beans as more 
negative than participants who had the pleasant-flavored jelly beans on all three judgments 
(bad – good; unpleasant – pleasant; disgusting – delicious), zU’s ≥ 7.54, ps ≤ 0.001. 
Participants who ate the unpleasant-flavored jelly beans were also less looking forward to 
eating jelly beans than were participants who ate pleasant-flavored jelly beans, zU = 5.30, p ≤ 
0.001. 
Second, I examined participants’ perceptions of the repetitive questions. Results 
failed to detect differences in participants’ perceptions of the repetitive questions on any of 
the five judgments (soothing – irritating; varied – repetitive; interesting – boring; pleasant – 
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unpleasant; enjoyable – annoying), zU’s ≤ 1.06, ps ≥ 0.29. Neither was the difference in 
participants’ expectancy of the repetitive questions detected, zU = 0.29, p = 0.77.  
Table 7. Experiment 1 descriptive statistics of negative utility manipulation check items. 
 
These results suggest that the utility manipulation successfully differentiated 
participants’ perceptions towards one component of the proximal outcome (the jelly beans), 
but not the other (the repetitive questions). To assess participants’ overall perceptions of the 
proximal outcome, I examined participants’ responses to the last manipulation check item. 
However, results indicated that the utility manipulation did not significantly influence 
participants’ perception of the proximal outcome, zU = 1.30, p = 0.19. 
 
 
  Negative utility of proximal outcome 
 
 
Low  
(very cherry) 
High  
(stinky socks) 
The jelly beans were… 
1 (negative) – 7 (positive) 
bad - good 5.90 (1.48) 3.68 (2.06) 
unpleasant - pleasant 5.83 (1.51) 3.65 (2.00) 
disgusting - delicious 5.79 (1.56) 3.61 (1.86) 
How much were you looking forward to eating a jelly bean? 
1 (not at all looking forward to) – 7 (very looking forward to) 
3.54 (1.57) 2.39 (1.41) 
    
The additional questions about 
Iowans and Americans were… 
1 (negative) – 7 (positive) 
unpleasant - pleasant 2.49 (1.32) 2.40 (1.37) 
annoying – enjoyable 2.05 (1.17) 2.02 (1.14) 
irritating – soothing 2.24 (1.15) 2.08 (1.13) 
repetitive – varied 1.31 (0.73) 1.26 (0.70) 
boring - interesting 1.69 (0.93) 1.72 (1.03) 
How much were you looking forward to answering the 
additional questions about Iowans and Americans? 
1 (not at all looking forward to) – 7 (very looking forward to) 
1.40 (0.70) 1.39 (0.73) 
   
How glad were you when the illegal behavior interview was 
completely done? 
1 (not at all glad) – 7 (very glad) 
5.41 (1.26) 5.58 (1.40) 
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Main Analyses 
The primary interest of Experiment 1 was to examine the influence of the two 
experimental factors, namely, the contingency pairing and the negative utility of proximal 
outcome, on participants’ admission decisions to the 20 prior illegal and unethical behaviors. 
In particular, I hypothesized that participants would shift their admission decisions to avoid 
the proximal outcome when it was perceived to be more negative versus less negative. 
To evaluate the effects of the experimental factors, I employed two different 
statistical models to analyze the data. The first model treated the total number of admissions 
made by each participant as the dependent variable and investigated the effects of the two 
factors under the framework of a Gauss-Markov model. The second and more complicated 
model adopted the approach of a generalized linear mixed-effects model, in which 
participants’ dichotomous responses to each of the 20 interview questions (i.e., a denial or an 
admission) constituted the random variables of interest. In addition to the fixed effects of 
between-subjects factors (i.e., contingency pairing and negative utility of proximal outcome), 
this model also examined the fixed effects of within-subjects factors (i.e., question 
characteristics and positions) as well as the random effects of participants. 
Model 1: Gauss-Markov model 
In the first model, I defined the random variable 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 as the total number of 
admissions made by participant k in the ith contingency pairing condition and the jth negative 
utility condition. The support of 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 thus is 
Ω𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 = {0, 1, 2, … , 20} 
Because the support of 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 is discrete and finite, the Gauss-Markov linear model may 
not be the model that best conforms to the structure of the data. However, for two reasons, I 
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employed this simple but classical model to initially explore the effects of the two 
experimental factors. First of all, the summation of the 20 Bernoulli trials were approximally 
normal even though those trials are neither identical nor independent. The Shapiro-Wilk 
normality test indicated that the residuals of the variable were normally distributed, W = 0.99, 
p = 0.39. Therefore, the inferences derived from the Gauss-Markov model may be relatively 
reasonable. Secondly, the Gauss-Markov model has been employed in previous studies with 
the same paradigm (e.g.,Madon et al., 2012; Madon et al., 2013; Yang, Madon, & Guyll, 
2015) because the inferences generated by the model were generally easy to interpret and 
understand. Therefore, I assumed that the random variable 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 defined above follows a 
Gauss-Markov model, namely, 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝜇 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗 + (𝛼𝛽)𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘, 𝑖 = 1,2; 𝑗 = 1,2; 𝑘 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑖𝑗 
where µ is the intercept parameter; 𝛼1and 𝛼2 are the fixed contingency pairing effects; 𝛽1 
and 𝛽2 are the fixed negative utility effects; (𝛼𝛽)11, (𝛼𝛽)12, (𝛼𝛽)21, and (𝛼𝛽)22 are the 
fixed effects allowing the interaction between contingency pairing and negative utility of 
proximal outcome; and the 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘 terms are i.i.d. 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) random errors. The research 
hypothesis that the difference in the utility of the proximal outcome would lead to a 
difference in participants’ interview responses can thus be translated into testing a hypothesis 
of an interaction between the two experimental factors, i.e., the null hypothesis was 
𝐻0: (𝛼𝛽)11 − (𝛼𝛽)12 − (𝛼𝛽)21 + (𝛼𝛽)22 = 0,  
and the alternative hypothesis was 
𝐻𝐴: (𝛼𝛽)11 − (𝛼𝛽)12 − (𝛼𝛽)21 + (𝛼𝛽)22 ≠ 0. 
To test the hypothesis, I fit the above Gauss-Markov model to the data. The results 
showed that the interaction was not significant, F(1, 199) = 2.24, p = 0.14, η2 = 0.009. 
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Therefore, the obtained data did not support the alternative hypothesis of an interaction 
between contingency pairing and utility of proximal outcome, which implied that the 
influence of the proximal outcome on participants’ decisions did not change as a function of 
its perceived utility. Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics, and Figure 4 depicts the 
distribution of the dependent variable in each experimental condition. 
Table 8. Experiment 1 descriptive statistics of total number of admissions. 
  
Negative utility of proximal outcome 
   Low 
(very cherry) 
High 
(stinky socks) 
Contingency 
pairing 
Denial- 
proximal outcome 
11.06 (4.12) 
n = 52 
11.37 (3.64) 
n = 52 
Admission-
proximal outcome 
8.20 (3.43) 
n = 49 
7.02 (2.97) 
n = 52 
 
I also tested the main effects of contingency pairing and negative utility of proximal 
outcome. Results indicated that the main effect of negative utility of proximal outcome was 
not significant, F(1, 199) = 0.76, p = 0.39, η2 = 0.003; but the main effect of contingency 
pairing was significant, F(1, 199) = 51.83, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.20. Further analysis showed that 
participants in the “denial-proximal outcome” contingency pairing condition (M = 11.22, SD 
= 3.87) made more admissions than participants in the “admission-proximal outcome” 
contingency pairing condition (M = 7.59, SD = 3.24), t (199) = 7.20, p < 0.001; d = 1.01, 
95% CI [0.73, 1.28].  
The pattern of the results was the same when I excluded the data from participants 
who were suspicious about the police officer and who misreported the contingency pairing. 
Neither the interaction nor the main effect of negative utility of proximal outcome were 
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significant, Fs (1, 195) ≤ 1.47, ps ≥ 0.23. Only the main effect of contingency pairing was 
significant, F (1, 195) = 49.41, p < 0.001.  
 
Figure 4. Box plot of total number of admissions in Experiment 1. The stars depict the mean 
number of admissions in each experimental condition. 
Model 2: Generalized linear mixed-effects model 
As discussed above, the Gauss-Markov model did not best characterize the structure 
of the data, and therefore might not be sensitive enough to detect the effects of the 
experimental manipulations. A more sensitive and precise approach was to model the data 
using a generalized linear mixed-effects model. Taking this approach, I defined the random 
variables 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 as the dichotomous response made by participant k to the question l in the i
th 
contingency pairing condition and the jth negative utility condition: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 = {
1, if the response is an admission,
0, if the response is a denial.
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It is reasonable to assume that 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 follows a Bernoulli distribution (Casella & 
Berger, 2001, p. 89) and therefore model the probability parameter of the Bernoulli 
distribution as a function of the fixed effects of experimental factors and the random effect of 
participants. To employ a generalized linear mixed-effect model approach, I set up the model 
as follows. 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙| 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 ~ Bernoulli  𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 , 
log (
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙
1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙
) = 𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙  (defined below) 
𝑖 = 1,2; 𝑗 = 1,2; 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑛𝑖𝑗;  𝑙 = 1,2, … , 20;  0 < 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 < 1 
In this model, the linear predictor 𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 is a linear combination of different fixed 
effects and potential random effects. According to what the research question is, there can be 
different choices for the format of the linear predictor 𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙. First, I assessed the effects of the 
two experimental manipulations (i.e., contingency pairing and negative utility of the 
proximal outcome) controlling for the random participant effect. Thus, the linear predictor 
𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 takes the form of 
𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 = 𝜇 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗 + (𝛼𝛽)𝑖𝑗 + 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘 
where, similar to the Gauss-Markov model, µ is the intercept parameter; 𝛼1and 𝛼2 are the 
fixed contingency pairing effects; 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are the fixed negative utility effects; (𝛼𝛽)11, 
(𝛼𝛽)12, (𝛼𝛽)21, and (𝛼𝛽)22 are the fixed effects allowing for the interaction. In addition, the 
𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘 terms are i.i.d. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑠
2) random participant effects. The hypothesis of interest was the 
same as that of the Gauss-Markov model, i.e., the null hypothesis was 𝐻0: (𝛼𝛽)11 −
(𝛼𝛽)12 − (𝛼𝛽)21 + (𝛼𝛽)22 = 0. 
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In order to test the hypothesis, I used the SAS GLIMMIX procedure to build the 
model and analyze the data. The results of the generalized mixed-effects model were 
consistent with those of the Gauss-Markov model. The interaction between the two 
experimental manipulations was not significant, F(1, 3855) = 1.58, p = 0.21, which indicated 
that the obtained data did not support the research hypothesis that participants would be more 
likely to shift their admissions to avoid the proximal outcome the more negatively they 
perceived it. 
 The main effect of negative utility of proximal outcome was not significant, F(1, 
3855) = 1.10, p = 0.29. Only the main effect of contingency pairing was significant, F(1, 
3855) = 50.78, p < 0.001. For participants in the “denial-proximal outcome” contingency 
pairing condition, the odds of admitting to the illegal behavior questions were 2.19 times as 
high as that for participants in the “admission-proximal outcome” contingency pairing 
condition, OR = 2.19, 95% CI [1.77, 2.72]. This result replicates the previous research 
finding that interrogated suspects generally give disproportionate weight to proximal than 
distal outcomes when making their confession decisions (Madon, et al., 2012, 2013). 
In addition, the generalized mixed-effects model allowed me to examine the effects of 
the within-subjects factors that could not be examined in the Gauss-Markov model. To 
understand the effects of illegal behaviors and question positions, I included these factors as 
covariates in the generalized mixed-effects model. The linear predictor 𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙, therefore, takes 
the form of 
𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 = 𝜇 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗 + (𝛼𝛽)𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑙 + 𝜏ℎ(𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑙) + 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘 
where, 𝛾1, 𝛾2, …, and 𝛾20 are the fixed illegal behavior effects; ℎ(𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, 𝑙) ∈ {1,2, … , 20} 
represents the position of the illegal behavior question l answered by participant k in the ith 
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contingency pairing condition and the jth negative utility condition, and 𝜏1, 𝜏2, …, and 𝜏20 are 
the fixed position effects.  
Results showed that the effect of illegal behaviors was significant, F(19, 3855) = 
28.77, p < 0.001, but the effect of question positions was not significant, F(19, 3855) = 1.27, 
p = 0.19. To further understand the how the characteristics of illegal behaviors influenced 
participants’ responses, I used the seriousness scores of illegal behaviors to replace the fixed 
effects of illegal behaviors in the model. Results revealed a significant effect of seriousness, 
F (1, 3873) = 68.28, p < 0.001. As the illegal behavior became more serious, participants 
were less likely to admit to have done it before, OR = 0.765, 95% CI [0.718, 0.815]. This 
result is consistent with the previous research showing that suspects’ tendency to confess 
varies as a function of the perceived seriousness of the crime (Madon et al., 2013). 
The pattern of the results was the same when I excluded the data from participants 
who were suspicious about the police officer and who misreported the contingency pairing. 
The interaction between contingency pairing and negative utility of proximal outcome, the 
effect of negative utility of proximal outcome, and the effect of question positions were not 
significant, Fs ≤ 1.17, ps ≥ 0.28. Only the effects of contingency pairing and illegal behaviors 
were significant, Fs ≥ 28.04, ps ≤ 0.001.  
To summarize, the analyses from the above two statistical models reached the same 
set of conclusions, though they employed different approaches. Basically, the results did not 
support the research hypothesis that participants’ admission decisions were influenced by the 
utility of a proximal outcome.  
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Discussion 
According to the interrogation decision-making model, one critical factor that affects 
suspects’ decision-making is the utility of proximal outcomes that are associated with their 
choices. The results of Experiment 1, however, did not provide evidence for the effect of a 
proximal outcome’s utility on participants’ admission decisions. The utility of the proximal 
outcome did not significantly influence participants’ tendency to shift their admissions to 
avoid the proximal outcome. Several reasons could have caused the failure to detect a 
significant effect.  
First, the utility manipulation might not have been strong enough to differentiate 
participants’ perceptions of the proximal outcome. Even though the analyses of the utility 
manipulation check items indicated that participants in the two utility conditions did have 
different perceptions of the jelly beans, their perceptions of the repetitive questions were not 
statistically different. It is possible that the repetitive questions were so negative that their 
effect overwhelmed the difference created by the jelly beans. As a result, the difference in 
participants’ perceptions of the entire proximal outcome, including both eating the jelly 
beans and answering the repetitive questions, might not be large enough to be detected. 
Indeed, both groups of participants responded similarly when they were asked how glad they 
were when the illegal behavior interview was done, which reflected that they might have 
perceived the proximal outcome as equally negative, no matter which jelly beans they ate.  
Second, the effects of jelly beans may not be universal across different individuals, 
which could also reduce the strength of the manipulation. Some participants, for example, 
expressed a fondness for the unpleasant-flavored jelly beans, and some participants did not 
like eating jelly beans at all, even the pleasant-flavored ones. For those participants, the jelly 
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beans might have changed their perceptions of the proximal outcome in the opposite 
direction, thereby complicating the results.  
Furthermore, there was too much variability in participants’ responses. From Figure 2 
and Table 7, it can be noted that the pattern of average number of admissions in the four 
experimental conditions was in the expected direction of the research hypothesis; however, 
the standard deviations were generally large. The variability in participants’ admissions could 
come from different sources including, participants’ actual misbehaviors, personality traits, 
intelligence level, etc. As a result, the effect size might shrink and become too small to 
detect. If the experiment had been able to assess and control for participants’ actual 
misbehaviors, the effect of the proximal outcome’s utility might have emerged. 
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CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENT 2 
The second experiment tested the hypothesis that a distal outcome’s effect on 
suspects’ interrogation decisions is larger the more negatively the distal outcome is 
perceived. Experiment 2 tested this hypothesis using the same contingency pairing 
manipulation that was used in Experiment 1. In addition, Experiment 2 manipulated the 
utility of the distal outcome by leading participants to believe that they would speak with a 
police officer by phone (less negative) or in a face-to-face meeting (more negative).  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 161 participants were recruited from the Psychology Department’s research 
participant pool at Iowa State University. Participants took part in the study to satisfy a 
course requirement. Among all participants, one did not complete the experiment and two 
were not native English speakers. Therefore, I excluded them from the analyses, leaving 158 
participants in the final sample. In the final sample, 51.3% participants were female. The 
mean age was 19.5 (SD = 1.3). Participants included 136 Caucasians, six Asians, seven 
African Americans, seven Latina/o, and two participants who self-described as multiethnic.  
Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (Contingency pairing: denial-proximal 
outcome vs. admission-proximal outcome) × 2 (Negative utility of distal outcome: low vs. 
high) between-subjects experimental design. Following the procedures of Experiment 1, all 
participants were interviewed about their prior illegal and unethical behaviors and were 
required to admit or deny each one. Contingency pairing varied the outcomes that 
participants faced for their denials and admissions to the interview questions. In the “denial-
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proximal outcome” contingency pairing condition, each denial was paired with a proximal 
outcome and admissions were paired with a distal outcome. These contingencies were 
reversed in the “admission-proximal outcome” contingency pairing condition. The proximal 
outcome was answering a set of 32 repetitive questions, and the distal outcome was having to 
speak with a police officer involved in the research to discuss their interview responses in 
more detail in a few weeks. 
Negative utility of distal outcome varied the aversiveness of the distal outcome of 
having to speak with a police officer. Participants in the low negative utility condition were 
led to believe that they would speak with a police officer over the phone if their responses 
required it, whereas those in the high negative utility condition were led to believe that they 
would meet with a police officer in-person if their responses required it. This experimental 
manipulation was expected to vary participants’ perception of the distal outcome’s utility: 
Participants who had to meet with the police officer in-person were expected to perceive the 
potential meeting as more negative than those who had to speak with the police officer over 
the phone. 
Procedure, measures, and materials 
The procedures and materials in Experiment 2 were the same as those used in 
Experiment 1 except for the following modifications. First, the proximal outcome that 
participants faced was limited to the repetitive questions and did not involve eating any jelly 
beans. Therefore, the proximal outcome was constant across all experimental conditions. 
Second, Experiment 2 varied the negative utility of the distal outcome, as described above. 
Third, the manipulation check items were modified to assess participants’ perception of the 
distal outcome’s utility (Appendix G). Five of these items were bipolar adjectives that follow 
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the question stem “Please rate the meeting (phone call) with the police officer on these 
attributes; The meeting (phone call) will be (1) irritating – soothing; (2) painful – delightful; 
(3) boring – interesting; (4) unpleasant – pleasant; (5)annoying – enjoyable”. Participants 
were also asked “Overall, how much do you want to meet (speak) with the police officer to 
discuss your answers to the illegal behavior survey?”, with the endpoints 1 (not at all) and 7 
(a lot).  
Preliminary Analyses 
Suspicion and contingency pairing checks 
 Examination of participants’ responses to the suspicion question revealed that no 
participant doubted the veracity of the meeting with the police officer. A frequency analysis 
indicated that all participants correctly report the contingency pairing that was associated 
with their interview responses. Therefore, I included all participants’ data in the analyses. 
Negative utility manipulation check 
To examine whether the negative utility manipulation had the intended effect on 
participants’ perception of the distal outcome, I performed a series of non-parametric Mann-
Whitney U tests (Appendix G). Table 9 lists the descriptive statistics of participants’ 
responses to the negative utility manipulation check items.  
Results indicated that participants’ expectations to be interviewed by the police 
officer over the phone or in-person did not significantly influence their perception of the 
distal outcome on any of the five judgments (i.e., irritating –soothing; painful – 
delightful;boring – interesting; unpleasant – pleasant; annoying – enjoyable), zU’s ≤ 0.89, ps 
≥ 0.37. The negative utility manipulation also did not significantly influence how much 
participants wanted to speak or meet with the police officer, zU = 1.54, p = 0.12.  
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Table 9. Experiment 2 descriptive statistics of negative utility manipulation check items. 
 
These results indicate that the negative utility manipulation did not differentiate 
participants’ perception of the distal outcome. However, it is also possible that the negative 
utility manipulation check items failed to detect the effect of the experimental manipulation. 
As the 7-point scale of the manipulation check questions ranged from negative to positive 
ratings, participants generally used the negative half of the scale to rate their perceptions of 
the distal outcome, which might reduce the sensitivity of the questions. If the questions were 
in a comparative manner, for example, “Which one do you prefer, to meet with the police 
officer in-person or to speak with him over the phone?”, differences in participants’ 
perceptions of the distal outcome might have emerged.  
Another possible reason is the timing of the manipulation check questions. By the 
time participants answered the manipulation check questions, they had already done with the 
proximal outcome. At this point, participants’ perception of the distal outcome might have 
been influenced by their responses to the illegal behavior interview. The more serious the 
crimes participants admitted to, the more negative the distal outcome participants might have 
perceived to be. In addition, participants might have also hoped to avoid the distal outcome 
  Negative utility of distal outcome 
 
 
Low 
 (phone call) 
High 
(meeting) 
The meeting (phone call) 
would be… 
1 (negative) – 7 (positive) 
irritating –soothing 3.04 (1.30) 3.17 (1.60) 
painful – delightful 3.52 (1.29) 3.48 (1.31) 
boring – interesting 3.70 (1.71) 3.41 (1.74) 
unpleasant – pleasant 3.36 (1.36) 3.44 (1.49) 
annoying – enjoyable 3.21 (1.32) 3.28 (1.44) 
    
Overall, how much do you want to meet (speak) with 
the police officer to discuss your answers to the illegal 
behavior survey? 
1 (not at all) – 7 (a lot) 
2.31 (1.28) 2.04 (1.30) 
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with certain responses, for example, expressing aversiveness towards the possible meeting 
with the police officer. 
Main Analyses 
The primary interest of Experiment 2 was to examine the influence of the distal 
outcome’s utility on participants’ admission decisions to the 20 prior illegal and unethical 
behaviors. Experiment 2 had the same factorial design as Experiment 1, except for the 
experimental manipulation of the negative utility factor, which, in Experiment 2 pertained to 
the utility of the distal outcome. Because of the similarity in the experimental designs, I 
conducted the same set of analyses for Experiment 2 as I did for Experiment 1.  
Model 1: Gauss-Markov model 
In the first model, I defined the random variable 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 as the total number of 
admissions made by participant k in the ith contingency pairing condition and the jth negative 
utility condition. I assumed that the random variable 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 defined above follows a Gauss-
Markov model,  
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝜇 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗 + (𝛼𝛽)𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘, 𝑖 = 1,2; 𝑗 = 1,2; 𝑘 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑖𝑗 
where µ is the intercept parameter; 𝛼1and 𝛼2 are the fixed contingency pairing effects; 𝛽1 
and 𝛽2 are the fixed negative utility effects; (𝛼𝛽)11, (𝛼𝛽)12, (𝛼𝛽)21, and (𝛼𝛽)22 are the 
fixed effects allowing the interaction between contingency pairing and negative utility; and 
the 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘 terms are i.i.d. 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) random errors. The research hypothesis that the difference in 
the utility of the distal outcome would lead to a difference in participants’ interview 
responses can thus be translated into testing a hypothesis of an interaction between the two 
experimental factors, i.e., the null hypothesis was 
𝐻0: (𝛼𝛽)11 − (𝛼𝛽)12 − (𝛼𝛽)21 + (𝛼𝛽)22 = 0,  
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and the alternative hypothesis was 
𝐻𝐴: (𝛼𝛽)11 − (𝛼𝛽)12 − (𝛼𝛽)21 + (𝛼𝛽)22 ≠ 0. 
 
Figure 5. Box plot of total number of admissions in Experiment 2. The stars depict the mean 
number of admissions in each experimental condition. 
The results from the analysis of the above Gauss-Markov model indicated that the 
interaction was significant, F(1, 155) = 6.35, p = 0.013, η2 = 0.040. Therefore, the obtained 
data supported the alternative hypothesis of an interaction between contingency pairing and 
negative utility of distal outcome, which suggested that the distal outcome established 
different influences on participants’ admission decisions when its utility changed. From 
Figure 5, the discrepancy in participants’ admissions between the “denial-proximal outcome” 
and “admission-proximal outcome” contingency pairing conditions was larger in the low 
negative utility condition than in the high negative utility condition. This reflected that 
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participants gave less weight to the distal outcome in their decisions when it was perceived to 
be less negative versus more negative. 
The analyses of simple main effects of negative utility of distal outcome revealed that 
(1) participants made more admissions in the “denial-proximal outcome” contingency pairing 
condition than the “admission-proximal outcome” contingency pairing condition when 
participants expected to meet with the police officer in-person (high negative utility 
condition), F(1,155) = 4.06, p = 0.025; d = 0.48, 95% CI [0.06, 0.89]; (2) the difference in 
admissions between the two contingency pairing conditions was also significant when 
participants expected to speak with the police officer over the phone (low negative utility 
condition), and to a greater extent, F(1, 155) = 31.38, p < 0.001; d = 1.42, 95% CI [0.94, 
1.91]. These results suggested that participants tended to give disproportional weight to the 
proximal outcome in their decisions, and this tendency became greater as the distal outcome 
became less negative. Table 10 presents the descriptive statistics of the admissions made by 
participants in each experimental condition. 
Table 10. Experiment 2 descriptive statistics of the total number of admissions. 
  
Negative utility of distal outcome 
   Low 
(phone call) 
High 
(in-person meeting) 
Contingency 
pairing 
Denial- 
proximal outcome 
11.38 (3.80) 
n = 39 
10.41 (4.10) 
n = 40 
Admission-
proximal outcome 
6.58 (2.85) 
n = 38 
8.61 (3.67) 
n = 41 
 
I also tested the main effects of contingency pairing and negative utility of distal 
outcome. Results indicated that the main effect of negative utility of distal outcome was not 
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significant, F(1, 155) = 0.73, p = 0.40, η2 = 0.005; but the main effect of contingency pairing 
was significant, F(1, 155) = 32.53, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.18. Further analysis showed that 
participants in the “denial-proximal outcome” contingency pairing condition (M = 10.90, SD 
= 3.96) made more admissions than participants in the “admission-proximal outcome” 
contingency pairing condition (M = 7.63, SD = 3.44), t (155) = 5.70, p < 0.001; d = 1.01, 
95% CI [0.73, 1.28].  
Model 2: Generalized linear mixed-effects model 
Similar to the analyses for Experiment 1, I also modeled the data using a generalized 
linear mixed-effects model. Taking this approach, I defined the random variables 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 as the 
dichotomous response made by participant k to the question l in the ith contingency pairing 
condition and the jth negative utility condition: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 = {
1, if the response is an admission,
0, if the response is a denial.
 
I set up the model as follows. 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙| 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 ~ Bernoulli  𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 , 
log (
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙
1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙
) = 𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙  (defined below) 
𝑖 = 1,2; 𝑗 = 1,2; 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑛𝑖𝑗;  𝑙 = 1,2, … , 20;  0 < 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 < 1 
The linear predictor 𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 is a linear combination of different fixed effects and 
potential random effects. According to what the research question is, there can be different 
choices for the format of the linear predictor 𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙. First, I assessed the effects of the two 
experimental manipulations (i.e., contingency pairing and negative utility of the proximal 
outcome) controlling for the random participant effects. Thus, the linear predictor 𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 takes 
the form of 
69 
𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙 = 𝜇 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗 + (𝛼𝛽)𝑖𝑗 + 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘 
where, similar to the Gauss-Markov model, µ is the intercept parameter; 𝛼1and 𝛼2 are the 
fixed contingency pairing effects; 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are the fixed negative utility effects; (𝛼𝛽)11, 
(𝛼𝛽)12, (𝛼𝛽)21, and (𝛼𝛽)22 are the fixed effects allowing for the interaction. In addition, the 
𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘 terms are i.i.d. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑠
2) random participant effects. The hypothesis of interest was also 
the interaction between contingency pairing and negative utility of distal outcome, i.e., the 
null hypothesis was 𝐻0: (𝛼𝛽)11 − (𝛼𝛽)12 − (𝛼𝛽)21 + (𝛼𝛽)22 = 0. 
The results from the analysis of the above generalized mixed-effects model were 
consistent with those of the Gauss-Markov model. The interaction between the two 
experimental manipulations was significant, F(1, 3001) = 7.06, p < 0.01, which supported the 
research hypothesis. The analyses of simple main effects also revealed the same pattern as 
those of the Gauss-Markov model: (1) When expecting to speak with the police officer over 
the phone, participants were more likely to make an admission in the “denial-proximal 
outcome” contingency pairing condition than in the “admission-proximal outcome” 
contingency pairing condition, F(1, 3001) = 32.37, p < 0.001; OR = 2.82, 95% CI [1.97, 
4.02]; (2) When expecting to meet with the police officer in-person, they were also more 
likely to make an admission in the “denial-proximal outcome” contingency pairing condition 
than in the “admission-proximal outcome” contingency pairing condition, but to a smaller 
extent, F(1, 3001) = 4.26, p = 0.04; OR = 1.44, 95% CI [1.02, 2.03].  
The main effect of negative utility of distal outcome was not significant, F(1, 3001) = 
0.75, p = 0.39. The main effect of contingency pairing was significant, F(1, 3001) = 
30.31=54, p < 0.001; for participants in the “denial-proximal outcome” contingency pairing 
condition, the odds of admitting to the illegal behavior questions were 2.01 times as high as 
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that for participants in the “admission-proximal outcome” contingency pairing condition, OR 
= 2.01, 95% CI [1.57, 2.58]. 
I also tested the effects of illegal behaviors and question positions under the 
generalized linear mixed-effects model. The effect of illegal behaviors was significant, F(19, 
2963) = 27.35, p < 0.001; and the effect of question positions was not significant, F(19, 
2963) = 1.19, p = 0.26. Similar to the analysis in Experiment 1, I next used the seriousness 
scores of the illegal behaviors to replace the fixed effects of illegal behaviors to examine how 
the seriousness of the illegal behaviors influenced participants’ admission decisions. Results 
revealed a significant effect of seriousness, F (1, 2981) = 73.33, p < 0.001. As an illegal 
behavior became more serious, participants were less likely to admit to having done it, OR = 
0.725, 95% CI [0.673, 0.780]. 
Discussion 
According to the interrogation decision-making model, a critical factor that affects 
suspects’ decision-making is the utility of distal outcomes associated with their choices. 
Consistent with this idea, the results of Experiment 2 provided evidence for the effect of a 
distal outcome’s utility on participants’ admission decisions. It showed that participants were 
more likely to shift their admission decisions to avoid the proximal outcome the more 
negative they perceived the distal outcome to be. This finding has important implications for 
understanding suspects’ confession decisions within a custodial interrogation.  
First, the current research finding helps to understand the effects of some 
interrogation techniques on suspects’ confession decisions. Minimization techniques, for 
example, may alter suspects’ confession decisions by manipulating their perception of the 
utility of distal outcomes. With minimization techniques, police interrogators downplay the 
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seriousness of the offense or the legal consequences of a confession (Kassin & McNall, 
1991), which may lead suspects to expect less severe future punishment following their 
confessions. In other words, such techniques manipulate suspects’ perception of the utility of 
distal outcomes associated with a confession. As a result, both innocent and guilty suspects 
may be more willing to confess as a way to get out of the interrogation when police 
interrogators apply these techniques. Therefore, the effect of a distal outcome’s utility on 
suspects’ confession decisions explains the previous research finding that the usage of 
minimization techniques increases both true and false confessions (Russano et al., 2005; 
Houston et al., 2014).  
Along the same line, the effect of a distal outcome’s utility is also relevant to 
understanding how crime type and seriousness affect suspects’ confession decisions. 
Suspects’ perception of the utility of distal outcomes may vary as a function of crime type 
and seriousness. They may perceive that the future punishment following their confessions 
will be less severe for non-violent versus violent crimes as well as minor versus serious 
crimes. Applying the findings of the current research, both innocent and guilty suspects may 
be more likely to confess when interrogated for non-violent and minor crimes because the 
utility of distal outcomes associated with a confession is less negative for these crimes. 
Indeed, previous research has shown that suspects more readily confess to non-violent crimes 
than violent ones (Mitchell, 1983), and to minor offenses than serious ones (St-Yves, 2002; 
Madon et al., 2013).  
This further implies that both true and false confessions might be more common for 
non-violent and minor crimes than violent and serious ones. However, false confessions 
involved in non-violent and minor cases may never be revealed because these cases generally 
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contain no DNA evidence and attract no post-conviction scrutiny (Gudjonsson, 2003). 
Innocent suspects may, as a result, have to endure unjust suffering especially for the non-
violent and minor crimes. This underscores the importance for the legal system to enact 
interrogation reforms to protect innocent suspects from wrongful convictions not only for 
violent and serious crimes, but also for non-violent and minor ones. 
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CHAPTER 7. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
According to the proposed interrogation decision-making model, an outcome’s utility 
influences suspects’ confession decisions. My dissertation included two experiments that 
examined the effects of a proximal outcome’s utility and a distal outcome’s utility on 
participants’ admission decisions, respectively. Experiment 1 tested whether a proximal 
outcome’s utility influenced participants’ admission decisions, but failed to detect the effect. 
One possible reason might be that the experimental manipulation was too weak to create a 
meaningful difference in participants’ perceptions of the utility of the proximal outcome. 
Experiment 2 tested whether a distal outcome’s utility influenced participants’ admission 
decisions. Consistent with the model, the results indicated that participants were more likely 
to shift their admission decisions to avoid a proximal outcome when they perceived the distal 
outcome to be less negative versus more negative. This finding provides evidence that the 
utility of a distal outcome plays an important role in suspects’ decision-making.  
Implications of the Interrogation Decision-Making Model 
Though the findings of the two experiments did not fully support the predictions of 
the interrogation decision-making model, the contributions and limitations of the model 
warrant discussion. The model provides a useful framework to understand and explain 
suspects’ interrogation decisions, and in this way, makes significant theoretical and applied 
contributions. 
First, the model recognizes the complexity and the dynamic nature of suspects’ 
decision-making processes during an interrogation. It points out that this process usually 
involves multiple decisions and is influenced by a large number of factors. Second, the model 
disentangles the complexity of suspects’ decision-making by differentiating between the 
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micro- and macro-level processes. The micro-level process focuses on the psychological 
mechanisms underlying a single interrogation decision, and thus is able to explain how 
suspects reach a specific decision. The macro-level process focuses on the entire flow of an 
interrogation, and thus is able to describe changes among suspects’ decisions. Hence, this 
differentiation not only clarifies suspects’ decision-making at different levels, but enhances 
both the descriptive and explanatory power of the model. 
What is more, the model integrates the micro- and macro-level processes and 
constructs a theoretical framework to present the whole picture of suspects’ decision-making 
within the context of a custodial interrogation. As illustrated in Chapter 3 “Model 
Application”, this framework is able to explain and predict the effects of a variety of factors 
on suspects’ confession decisions. A number of findings reported in the literature support the 
model's predictions. For example, a meta-analysis of psychological factors relevant to 
suspects’ confessions suggested that internal pressure (e.g., feeling of guilt and remorse) 
leads to true confessions, while external pressure (e.g., disapproval or disbelief from 
interrogators) leads to false confessions (Houston et al., 2014). This is consistent with the 
model's prediction that proximal outcomes play an important role in suspects’ decision-
making during an interrogation. As guilty and innocent suspects are faced with different sets 
of proximal outcomes, their confessions may be driven by different psychological factors. 
The meta-analysis also showed that suspects tended to consider the strengths of incriminating 
evidence and legal consequences of confessing (Houston et al., 2014), which lends support to 
the model's prediction that distal outcomes play an essential role in suspects’ decision-
making process. In summary, the model provides a useful tool to organize and integrate 
empirical findings on police interrogation and confessions. 
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Most importantly, the model can provide important implications for the legal system. 
For example, the model can be used to analyze the effects of a specific interrogation 
technique on guilty and innocent suspects separately (e.g., the analysis for the bluff technique 
in Chapter 3), and thus to evaluate whether the same interrogation technique has different 
effects on guilty versus innocent suspects.  
Table 9. Effects of an interrogation technique on guilty versus innocent suspects. 
 
Ideally, an interrogation technique should be able to differentiate the reactions of 
guilty and innocent suspects—encouraging guilty suspects to confess while preventing 
innocent suspects from false confessions. As shown in Table 9, I label such interrogation 
techniques as differentiating techniques. There are three other situations in Table 9. If an 
interrogation technique drives both guilty and innocent suspects towards confessions, then I 
label it as a confession-prone technique. Similarly, if an interrogation technique moves both 
groups from confessions towards denials, I label it as a denial-prone technique. The worst 
situation involves assimilating techniques, in which case the interrogation technique 
encourages innocent suspects but not guilty suspects to confess. With this taxonomy, the 
legal system can decide which category an interrogation technique falls into according to its 
effects on guilty and innocent suspects. The interrogation decision-making model, therefore, 
Effects on 
confessions 
Guilty suspects 
↑ ↓ 
Innocent 
suspects 
↑ Confession-prone Assimilating 
↓ Differentiating Denial-prone 
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provides a useful tool for the legal system to understand the effects of different interrogation 
techniques and to develop differentiating techniques that can protect innocent suspects from 
false confessions without turning guilty suspects loose.  
Limitations of the Interrogation Decision-Making Model 
As Box (1987) pointed out, “essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful”, 
and in line with this sentiment there are several limitations associated with the interrogation 
decision-making model that warrant discussion.  
First, the model does not specify the exact form of the probability function, 𝑝(∙), and 
the utility function, 𝑢(∙). In other words, it does not specify the relation between suspects’ 
subjective judgment and the objective value of the probability or the utility of an outcome. 
As revealed in large amount of research in judgment and decision making, the subjective 
value of an outcome may not necessarily be identical to its objective value, in other 
words, 𝑝(∙) and 𝑢(∙) may not be a simple linear function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Though the model does not elaborate the relation between 
suspects’ subjective judgments and objective values, I do emphasize that the probability 
function, 𝑝(∙), and the utility function, 𝑢(∙), represent suspects’ subjective judgments instead 
of objective values of the probability and the utility of an outcome. Concretely speaking, the 
model proposes that it is suspects’ subjective perceptions that influence their confession 
decisions, not the objective values of the outcomes.  
Second, the model simplifies the relations among different parameters. According to 
Equation 1, the model assumes that the expected utility of a choice is a linear function of all 
parameters. The simple linear function, however, may not accurately capture the relation 
between the expected utility and its parameters. For example, the expected utility may be 
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proportional to the cubic function of the discount rate θ (i.e., 𝐸 𝑢(𝒙) ∝ 𝜃3) or the 
exponential function of 𝐸 𝑢(𝒙𝒅)  and 𝜃 (i.e., 𝐸 𝑢(𝒙) ∝  𝐸 𝑢(𝒙𝒅) 
𝜃). The reason that I take 
a linear function is that it captures the monotonic relation between the expected utility and 
relevant parameters with the simplest form. 
Third, the model simplifies the perceived outcomes into two groups: proximal and 
distal. It assumes that suspects discount all the distal outcomes to the same extent with a 
single discount rate 𝜃. However, suspects may not perceive different distal outcomes to occur 
at the same time point. Instead, suspects may perceive T groups of distal outcomes to occur at 
T different time points in the future. Consequently, suspects may discount different groups of 
distal outcomes to a different degree in their decisions. Indeed, Equation 1 can be generalized 
to  
Equation 4. 
𝐸 𝑢(𝒙)  = ∑ 𝐸 𝑢(𝒙𝒕) 
𝑇
𝑡=0 = ∑ 𝜃(𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=0 ∑ 𝑝(𝑥𝑡𝑖)𝑢(𝑥𝑡𝑖)
𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1   
In which a choice x yields (𝑇 + 1) groups of outcomes (𝒙𝟎, 𝒙𝟏, … , 𝒙𝑻). The sub-
vector 𝒙𝒕 = (𝑥𝑡1, 𝑥𝑡2, … , 𝑥𝑡𝑛𝑡) presents all possible outcomes that suspects perceive to 
happen at time 𝑡 =  0, 1, … , 𝑇. 𝜃(𝑡) presents suspects’ discount rate for the outcomes 𝒙𝒕 and 
is a monotonically decreasing function of the time variable t. 𝜃(𝑡) is bounded within 0 and 1, 
with 𝜃(0) = 1 and 𝜃(∞) = 0. It can be observed that Equation 1 is a special case of 
Equation 4. In Equation 1, the proximal outcomes can be considered as outcomes that 
suspects perceive to occur immediately at time 𝑡 =  0, and therefore the discount rate for 
proximal outcomes becomes 𝜃(0) = 1; the distal outcomes can be considered as outcomes 
that suspects perceived to occur at a future time point T and these outcomes are discounted to 
the same extent with a discount rate 𝜃(T) = 𝜃. 
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It can be further assumed the discount function 𝜃(∙) not only depends on the time 
variable t, but on the specific outcome 𝑥𝑡i as well. In other words, suspects’ tendency to 
discount a distal outcome may be influenced by both the temporal distance and the 
characteristics of the outcome. Thus, Equation 4 can be updated to, 
Equation 5. 
𝐸 𝑢(𝒙)  = ∑ 𝐸 𝑢(𝒙𝒕) 
𝑇
𝑡=0 = ∑ ∑ 𝜃(𝑡, 𝑥𝑡𝑖)𝑝(𝑥𝑡𝑖)𝑢(𝑥𝑡𝑖)
𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑡=0
  
Though Equation 4 and 5 are more generalized and can thus deal with more 
complicated situations involving uncertain and inter-temporal choices, I consider that the 
interrogation decision-making model with Equation 1 is appealing to understanding suspects’ 
confession decisions. On one hand, suspects may generally consider all future outcomes 
together in their decision-making processes, even though these outcomes may not happen at 
the same time in the future. Therefore, the interrogation decision-making model, though 
simplified, may capture suspects’ decision-making with fair accuracy. On the other hand, 
assigning different discount rates to different distal outcomes makes it difficult to describe 
suspects’ tendency to discount future outcomes. In application, it is concise to use one 
parameter 𝜃 to describe suspects’ individual differences in discounting. In addition, most 
police interrogation techniques may only manipulate suspects’ perceptions of the probability 
and utility of specific outcome(s), but may not directly manipulate suspects’ tendency to 
discount distal outcome(s). Hence, it may not be necessary to include different discount rates 
for different outcomes. For the above reasons, I consider the interrogation decision-making 
model to be parsimonious and adequate to describe and understand suspects’ interrogation 
decisions.  
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To summarize, the limitations of the interrogation decision-making model are tied to 
the mathematical nature of the model. The model uses mathematical parameters and formulas 
to organize the psychological processes underlying suspects’ confession decisions. But in 
reality, human being are more complex and do not operate in the same way as formulated in 
the model. For example, people probably do not explicitly form numeric estimations of 
probabilities and utilities; they probably do not have a concrete number for the discount rate 
in their mind; and they probably do not directly calculate the expected utilities of their 
choices. In other words, the model does not represent exactly what happens in the real world. 
Nevertheless, just as asserted by Killeen (1999), “models of phenomena are not causes of 
phenomena; they are descriptions of hypothetical structures or functions that aid explanation, 
prediction, and control” (p. 273). 
Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I have presented the interrogation decision-making model as a 
way to understand suspects’ decision-making process within the context of a custodial 
interrogation. The model proposes that suspects’ decision-making can be analyzed at two 
different levels—a micro-level process that explains the psychological mechanisms that 
underlie suspects’ individual interrogation decisions at particular points in time, and a macro-
level process that describes changes among suspects’ multiple interrogation decisions 
throughout an interrogation. Incorporating the tenets of expected utility theory, the micro-
level process of the model proposes that interrogated suspects make a single decision to deny 
or confess guilt on the basis of evaluating and comparing the expected utilities of these 
choices. The macro-level process reveals the dynamic nature of an interrogation and 
identifies three classes of factors that influence suspects’ decisions. The model further 
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combines these two processes and shows how they jointly can explain suspects’ decision-
making processes throughout the course of an interrogation. 
This dissertation also includes two experimental studies that examined the effects of 
two key components of the model—a proximal outcome’s utility and a distal outcome’s 
utility—on suspects’ confession decisions. Experiment 1 failed to detect the effect of a 
proximal outcome’s utility, but Experiment 2 supported the effect of a distal outcome’s 
utility. Although the results of the two experiments did not fully support the research 
hypotheses, the interrogation decision-making model still provides a useful theoretical 
framework to understand and analyze suspects’ confession decisions within the context of a 
custodial interrogation.  
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APPENDIX A: INFORMED CONSENT 
Title of Study: Illegal Behavior Study 
 
Investigators: Yueran Yang, Stephanie Madon, and Max Guyll 
 
This is a research study. Please take your time in deciding if you would like to participate. 
Please feel free to ask questions at any time. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to examine incident rates of illegal behaviors among college 
students. You are being invited to participate in this study because you are a student in a 
designated psychology class. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES 
If you agree to participate in this study, your participation will last 90 minutes during which 
time you will be asked to complete surveys designed to assess your demographic information 
(e.g., age, gender), personality traits, mood, behaviors, and perceptions. You may also be 
interviewed by staff involved in this project. You may decline to answer any question or to 
stop participating at any time without penalty.  
 
RISKS 
No physical risks are associated with participation in this study. In addition, because all of 
your responses will be anonymous, there are also no privacy or legality issues raised by your 
responses to questions assessing illegal behaviors. However, it is anticipated that some 
participants may feel a normal amount of unease responding to the questions that assess 
illegal behaviors. However, jelly beans are provided thereby raising the risk of an allergic 
reaction. If you are allergic to any of the following ingredients you should immediately alert 
the experimenter: 
 
Sugar, glucose or corn syrup, pectin or starch, modified cornstarch, natural and artificial 
flavorings, acidity regulator, glazing agents, colors, the emulsifying agent lecithin, anti-
foaming agents, an edible wax such as beeswax, salt, and confectioner's glaze. 
 
BENEFITS 
If you decide to participate in this study you will benefit by having had the educational 
opportunity for involvement in research. Additionally, it is hoped that the information gained 
in this study will benefit society by providing valuable information about incident rates of 
illegal behaviors among college students. 
 
COSTS AND COMPENSATION 
You will not incur any costs from participating in this study. You will be compensated for 
your participation with three research credits in your approved psychology course. As noted 
on your course syllabus, participation in experiments is one of the available options for 
acquiring experimental credit in your psychology course. Other options may include writing 
research papers or taking quizzes. Information about these alternatives is provided in your 
course syllabus. 
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PARTICIPANT RIGHTS 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may decline to participate or 
leave the study at any time. If you decide to not participate in the study or leave the study 
early, it will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Records identifying participants will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by 
applicable laws and regulations and will not be made publicly available. However, federal 
government regulatory agencies, auditing departments of Iowa State University, and the 
Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves human subject research 
studies) may inspect and/or copy your records for quality assurance and data analysis. These 
records may contain private information. To ensure confidentiality to the extent permitted by 
law, the following measures will be taken: You will be (a) assigned a unique code that will 
be used instead of your name; (b) your data will be combined with the data collected from 
other participants so that no individual information will be identifiable; (c) only members of 
the research team will have access to your data; and (d) your data will be kept in a locked file 
cabinet and/or in password protected computers that are located in restricted and locked 
rooms. If the results are published, your identity will remain anonymous. 
 
QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS 
You are encouraged to ask questions at any time during this study.  
 For further information about the study, contact Yueran Yang, M.S. (294-6587, 
yryang@iastate.edu) or Stephanie Madon, Ph.D. (294-2932, madon@iastate.edu). 
 If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or research-related 
injury, please contact the IRB Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or 
Director, (515) 294-3115, Office for Responsible Research, Iowa State University, 
Ames, Iowa 50011.  
*************************************************************************** 
PARTICIPANT SIGNATURE 
Your signature indicates that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, that the study 
has been explained to you, that you have been given the time to read the document and that 
your questions have been satisfactorily answered. You will receive a copy of the written 
informed consent prior to your participation in the study if you wish. 
 
Participant’s Name (printed)             
             
(Participant’s Signature)     (Date)  
 
INVESTIGATOR STATEMENT 
I certify that the participant has been given adequate time to read and learn about the study 
and all of their questions have been answered. It is my opinion that the participant 
understands the purpose, risks, benefits and the procedures that will be followed in this study 
and has voluntarily agreed to participate.  
       
(Signature of Person Obtaining Informed Consent) (Date) 
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
ILLEGAL BEHAVIOR SURVEY (less serious version) 
Have you ever: 
1. Drank, bought, or tried to buy alcohol before you were 21? Yes No 
2. Bought or held stolen goods worth $25 or more? Yes No 
3. Cheated on an exam, homework, school project, or helped another person cheat? Yes No 
4. Transported fireworks across state lines? Yes No 
5. Used something that belonged to somebody else without permission, such as something that 
belonged to a family member, friend, roommate or acquaintance?  
Yes No 
6. Hunted or fished without a license? Yes No 
7. Purposefully not returned something that you borrowed like a book, clothing, or money? Yes No 
8. Failed to wear a seat belt? Yes No 
9. Knowingly kept something of value that you received in error, such as extra change given to 
you by a cashier or extra merchandise from a store or from an internet purchase? Yes No 
10. Texted somebody while driving since it became illegal in Iowa? Yes No 
11. Engaged in criminal mischief such as a senior prank, egging a house or car, or TP-ing a house? Yes No 
12. Invaded another’s privacy such as by reading another’s diary, text messages or emails without 
permission? 
Yes No 
13. Jumped or cut in line such as at the dining hall, movie theater, or grocery store? Yes No 
14. Made a harassing, threatening, or prank phone call or text message? Yes No 
15. Driven a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any other drug like marijuana, 
cocaine, LSD, etc.? 
Yes No 
16. Ran a red light? Yes No 
17. Started or spread a rumor about someone? Yes No 
18. Been publicly intoxicated? Yes No 
19. Tried, used or experimented with any illegal drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, crack, LSD, or 
any other illegal drug? 
Yes No 
20. Illegally downloaded music, movies, software, or anything else? Yes No 
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APPENDIX C: REPETITIVE QUESTION SET 
Thinking about the average IOWAN... 
How invulnerable do you think the average Iowan would be feel while (insert crime from illegal 
behavior survey)? 
 (Repeat for each mood on list….) 
invulnerable disoriented 
self-important worthless 
gratified self-assured 
resentful self-conscious 
doubtful happy-go-lucky 
guilty surprised 
self-righteous strong 
jealous hostile 
 
Thinking about the average AMERICAN... 
How invulnerable do you think the average American would be while (insert crime from illegal 
behavior survey). 
 (Repeat for each mood on list….) 
invulnerable disoriented 
self-important worthless 
gratified self-assured 
resentful self-conscious 
doubtful happy-go-lucky 
guilty surprised 
self-righteous strong 
jealous hostile 
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APPENDIX D: SUSPICION CHECK  
 
1. Sometimes experiments study questions that are not obvious. Do you believe that is the 
case in this experiment? No:    Yes:   If yes, please indicate what research questions you 
believe might be under investigation in this experiment. 
 
              
 
             
 
              
 
 
 
2. Please indicate what you knew about this experiment before participating. 
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APPENDIX E: CONTINGENCY PAIRING CHECK  
 
1. Did you answer the additional questions about Iowans and Americans when you gave a 
‘no’ response or a ‘yes’ response to the illegal behavior survey? 
a) When I gave a ‘no’ response 
b) When I gave a ‘yes’ response 
c) Sometimes when I gave a ‘no’ response and sometimes when I gave a ‘yes’ response 
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APPENDIX F: EXPERIMENT 1 UTILITY MANIPULATION CHECK  
 
1. The jelly beans were…  
 
2. How much were you looking forward to eating a jelly bean?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all 
looking 
forward to 
  moderately 
looking 
forward to 
  very 
looking 
forward to 
 
 
3. The additional questions about Iowans and Americans were… 
 
 
4. How much were you looking forward to answering the additional questions about Iowans 
and Americans?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all 
looking 
forward to 
  moderately 
looking 
forward to 
  very 
looking 
forward to 
 
 
 
5. How glad were you when the illegal behavior interview was completely done? 
 
bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 good 
unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 pleasant 
disgusting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 delicious 
unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 pleasant 
annoying 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 enjoyable 
irritating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 soothing 
repetitive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 varied 
boring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 interesting 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all 
glad 
  moderately 
glad 
  very 
glad 
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APPENDIX G: EXPERIMENT 2 UTILITY MANIPULATION CHECK  
 
1. Please rate the meeting (phone call) with the police officer on these attributes:  
 
The meeting (phone call) will be… 
 
 
2. Overall, how much do you want to meet (speak) with the police officer to discuss your 
answers to the illegal behavior survey? 
 
 
 
  
irritating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 soothing 
painful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 delightful 
boring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 interesting 
unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 pleasant 
annoying 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 enjoyable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all   moderately   a lot 
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APPENDIX H: IRB APPROVAL  
 
